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Employer-sponsored employee involvement and participation
("EIP") programs have been proliferating over the last two decades
among American companies.! The impetus behind these programs is the
desire of companies to improve productivity and lower cost in response
to greater competitive pressure coupled with evidence from academic re-
search and two decades of experimentation in industry demonstrating
that these programs can indeed deliver higher performance and increased
employee job satisfaction.
Understandably, then, the management community reacted with
shock and dismay in 1992 when the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board") issued its now-famous decision in the Electroma-
tion case. The company, nonunion at the time, had formed five em-
ployee "action committees" to obtain feedback and proposals for change
on various company employment policies, such as those regarding atten-
dance, pay progression, and smoking, that were a source of dissatisfaction
to a number of the employees. From the company's point of view, it was
merely doing what academics, consultants, and policy experts constantly
advise managers to do-giving the workers a chance to get involved and
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participate in decisions that affected their work lives. Acting on a com-
plaint by the Teamsters Union, however, the NLRB determined that the
company's action teams constituted a labor organization, as defined in
section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"),4
and were "dominated" by the employer, in violation of section 8(a)(2) of
the Act.' As a result, the Board found the company guilty of an unfair la-
bor practice and ordered the employee committees disbanded.
A person unfamiliar with this area of labor law will likely find the
NLRB's Electromation ruling baffling. After all, from most people's per-
spective, it would appear to promote the public interest, rather than harm
it, to allow companies to solicit suggestions from groups of employees on
improving the organization's employment practices. In addition, more
participatory employment practices are widely touted in both the aca-
demic and practical literatures as an important source of competitive ad-
vantage in today's global economy. Nevertheless, the Board's ruling
seems to stifle such practices.
What explains this apparent incongruity between the dictates of labor
law and the canons of good business? Can a cogent argument still be
made that the restrictions placed on the operation and structure of EIP
programs by the NLRA ultimately serve the public interest? If such a
case cannot be made, how should the nation's labor law be revised?
These are the major questions that I address in this Article. I shall
proceed in three steps.
First, it is necessary to understand the purported public purpose
served by the NLRA and, more specifically, the rationale for banning
employer-dominated labor organizations through sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2). Based on congressional testimony, the writings and speeches of
Senator Robert Wagner, the Act's principal author, and other evidence, I
argue that the NLRA's major purpose was to promote greater unioniza-
tion and collective bargaining.6 Increased unionization was advocated,
first and foremost, as a means of promoting macroeconomic recovery
from the Great Depression.7 Inclusion of section 8(a)(2), together with
the broad definition of a "labor organization" in section 2(5), facilitated
4. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1996).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1996).
6. On the NLRA's goal of promoting greater unionization and collective bargaining, see
generally Leon Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACr: AFrER TEN YEARS 5
(Louis Silverberg ed., 1945). Keyserling was Senator Wagner's legislative assistant.
7. The macroeconomic purpose of the NLRA is elaborated in Bruce E. Kaufman, Why the
Wagner Act? Reestablishing Contact with Its Original Purpose, in ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATIONS 15 (David Lewin & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 1996). See also COLIN
GORDON, NEW DEALS: BusINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1920-1935, at 204-39
(1994); Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Inflation, Unemployment and the Wagner Act: A Critical Appraisal,
38 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1986).
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accomplishment of this goal. Trade unions, unlike company-created em-
ployee organizations, have greater ability both to raise wages-increasing
consumer buying power and aggregate demand in the economy-and to
take wages out of competition through industry-wide trade agreements-
ending deflationary wage and price cuts that suppress aggregate demand.
Increased unionization was also advocated as a means of promoting
greater democracy in industry, because trade unions are more independ-
ent of employer control than company-created employee organizations
and are thus thought better able to provide effective representation of
employee interests.8 Wagner and allies also concluded that most often
employers create in-house employee organizations for purposes of union
avoidance, so banning them via sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) both protected
workers' freedom of association and encouraged the formation of inde-
pendent employee organizations run by the workers themselves.9
Having explained the rationales for banning nonunion employee or-
ganizations through sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, I next evalu-
ate them critically. I conclude that neither the macroeconomic rationales
nor the industrial democracy rationale for these sections was meritorious
at the time of the passage of the NLRA and that neither is meritorious
today. Instead, these provisions of the NLRA harm economic efficiency,
retard the spread of more participatory and democratic forms of work-
place organization, and unduly restrict employer and employee choice of
methods of joint cooperation and decisionmaking in the workplace. I
reach this conclusion based on three types of evidence: contemporary
theory and empirical research pertaining to nonunion forms of employee
representation and participation; field research in which I interview man-
agers and employees concerning their experiences with nonunion em-
ployee participation and representation; and a cross-national comparison
with nonunion forms of employee representation in Canada, where such
organizations are legal and widespread.
Given my conclusion that sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) do not promote
the public good nor the separate interests of employers and employees,
the third step in my analysis is to consider how these provisions of the
NLRA should be modified. I argue that the NLRA should be revised so
that nonunion employers may establish any form of employee represen-
tation and participation they desire, so long as the Act is also modified to
protect more fully and effectively workers' rights to join an independent
8. See Keyserling, supra note 6, at 12-14; Clyde Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's
Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 29,33-34 (1979).
9. In Congressional Testimony, Wagner stated: "The very first step toward genuine collec-
tive bargaining is the abolition of the employer-dominated union." 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 16 (1985)
(Statement of Sen. Wagner).
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union. The reasoning behind this conclusion is twofold. First, the net re-
sult of company-created forms of employee participation and representa-
tion is the promotion of greater economic efficiency and employee well-
being.0 Second, the appropriate way to ensure that employers only use
such forms of employee representation for legitimate, "win-win" out-
comes is to give employees a largely costless, unobstructed method to ob-
tain representation by an outside labor organization if they are dissatis-
fied with the employer's in-house council or committee.
Based on the above reasoning, I conclude that two recent proposals
for reform of the NLRA-the recommendations of the Commission on
the Future of Worker-Management Relations (the Dunlop Commis-
sion) 2 and the proposed Teamwork for Employees and Managers
("TEAM") Act13--are one-sided and should be rejected. I propose in-
stead that the NLRA be revised to mirror Canadian labor law. In par-
ticular, section 2(5) should be narrowed in scope so that nonunion forms
of representation are no longer considered statutorily covered "labor or-
ganizations," thereby permitting nonunion firms to establish and operate
whatever type of nonunion employee representation program is desired.
Section 8(a)(2), on the other hand, should remain as written to ensure
that bona fide trade unions remain independent of employer influence.
Finally, the Act should also be amended to expedite union representation
elections and strengthen penalties against employers for antiunion acts of
discrimination during organizing drives, such as the illegal discharge of
union supporters. Such an amendment would better protect the ability of
nonunion employees to obtain independent representation if they are
dissatisfied with the performance of the employer's plan.
Part II of this Article provides an historical overview of the origins
and purpose of EIP programs in American industry, the development
and growth of nonunion employee representation plans in the pre-
10. The positive effect that employee participation and representation programs have on
firm performance and employee well-being is described in DAVID LEVINE, REINVENTING THE
WORKPLACE 36-62 (1995). For case study evidence, see Paul S. Adler et al., Ergonomics, Em-
ployee Involvement, and the Toyota Production System: A Case Study of NUMMI's 1993 Model
Introduction, 50 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 416 (1997). Regarding plant safety, for example,
they state: "When management reliance on employee involvement is complemented by strong
employee voice and strong regulators, managers may find it in their interest to improve safety
as a means of maintaining high employee commitment and thereby improving business per-
formance." Id. at 416.
11. This argument is developed in detail in Bruce E. Kaufman & David I. Levine, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Employee Representation, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION:
HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne G. Taras
eds., forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION].
12. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 18-24 (1994).
13. S.295, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 634, 105th Cong. (1997).
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NLRA period, and the purpose of the NLRA and the rationale for inclu-
sion of section 8(a)(2). Turning from historical context to contemporary
developments, Part III summarizes the different perspectives on the
merits of the Electromation decision that have developed since the ruling
was issued in 1992 and the evidence for and against these alternative po-
sitions from academic research, surveys of employers and workers, and
government investigative reports.
Part IV provides an in-depth analysis of legal issues surrounding EIP
programs in nonunion companies. This discussion is organized into three
sections: examination of the structure or "anatomy" of various forms of
EIP bodies; review of the relevant legal doctrine and NLRB rulings as
they bear on section 8(a)(2) cases; and application of these legal criteria
to consideration of which aspects of the anatomy of EIP programs will
most likely be found to violate the NLRA.
To provide further insight on these matters, I present, in Part V, mini-
case studies of EIP programs at six companies. The case studies pro-
vide-for the first time in the academic literature-a detailed, in-depth
view of the extent to which companies at the cutting-edge of EIP practice
are utilizing various types of employee representational committees. The
findings from these case studies are quite different from those of previous
research studies. In particular, I find evidence that a greater proportion
of nonunion employee committees deal with prohibited subjects related
to terms and conditions of employment and that company-union-like
structures continue to exist in American industry despite their presumed
demise after the passage of the NLRA.
In Part VI, I assess the degree to which the EIP programs in these six
companies appear to step over the legal boundary set by the Electroma-
tion decision. Significant compliance questions exist, I conclude, for the
majority of them. In this section I also summarize the opinions gathered
from field interviews with more than a dozen managers, labor attorneys,
and consultants regarding the impact of the Electromation decision on
the viability of EIP programs and the extent to which these programs are
used for union avoidance purposes.
Based on the evidence collected from the case studies and field inter-
views, as well as the findings of research on both historical and contem-
porary aspects of nonunion employee representation, I examine in Part
VII the case for reform of the NLRA and the direction such reform
should take. I conclude the NLRA's provisions regarding nonunion rep-
resentation are too restrictive and should be revised to resemble Cana-
dian labor law.
Part VIII provides concluding remarks and observations. My recom-
mended changes to the NLRA are, in effect, a melding of the provisions
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of the TEAM Act and the proposals advanced by the Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations. The former favor the interests
of employers, the latter the interests of unions. The compromise position
described here provides the basis for a win-win outcome that promotes
the interests of all parties to the employment relationship.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Starting in the mid-1910s, hundreds of nonunion companies estab-
lished various forms of shop committees, works councils, and employee
representation plans.14 These employee bodies are today often called
"company unions," albeit somewhat inaccurately. 5 The conventional
wisdom today is that these employer-created representation plans were
largely sham organizations that provided employees with little real power
or benefit and existed largely to serve as union-avoidance devices. 16 Un-
questionably, union avoidance was a fundamental goal of nearly all non-
union companies during this period and a number of the works councils
and shop committees accomplished relatively little of a substantive na-
ture. 1 7 But this is only one-half of the story, the half that is focused on
most frequently. The other, less recognized half is the role these em-
14. For descriptions of these committees, councils, and plans, see generally DMSION OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPANY
UNIONS 1935, BULLETIN No. 634 (1937); Bruce E. Kaufman, Nonunion Employee Representa-
tion in the Pre-Wagner Act Years: A Reassessment, 20 J. LAB. RESEARCH 9 (1999); Bruce E.
Kaufman, Nonunion Employee Representation in the United States Prior to the Wagner Act, in
NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11 [hereinafter Kaufman, Prior to the
Wagner Act]; Daniel Nelson, The Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A Reexamination, 56
BUS. HIST. REV. 335 (1982).
15. The term "company union" is, strictly speaking, a misnomer when applied to many
nonunion employee representation committees. A union is an independent association of work-
ers representing employees of many different companies for purposes of collective bargaining
over the terms and conditions of employment; a nonunion employee representation committee
is created by the employer, often covers only a plant or subdivision thereof, frequently deals
with a limited number of issues not directly related to the determination of wages (for example,
health and the resolution of grievances), and eschews formal bargaining over terms and condi-
tions of employment for informal negotiation, consensus-building, improved communication,
and mutual problem-solving. In addition, unions have written constitutions, elected officers, and
independent treasuries and utilize strikes and other adversarial weapons to win their demands.
Some nonunion committees also have written charters or bylaws and elected delegates, but
most are small-scale, informally structured organizations, and all stress cooperation and mutual
gain over strikes and collective bargaining.
16. See HOWARD GITELMAN, LEGACY OF THE LUDLOW MASSACRE: A CHAPER IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 333 (1988) (discussing the view that employee representa-
tion "simply was a scheme for avoiding unions"); David Brody, Section 8(a)(2) and the Origins
of the Wagner Act, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 29, 44 (Sheldon
Friedman et al. eds., 1994) ("the works council was never conceived to be of any relevance to
better plant operations").
17. See, e.g., STUART BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM, 1880-1940, at 119-34
(1976); LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 1919-
1939, at 190 (1990) (stating that employee representation was "little more than a facade").
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ployee organizations played as vehicles for employee involvement and
participation.
Starting in the World War I period, a number of leading American
employers adopted an entirely new policy toward the management of la-
bor.8 Unlike the old human resource management ("HRM") model,
which treated employees like commodities to be bought as cheaply as
possible, motivated through coercive "drive" methods, and disposed of
when exhausted, this new model sought to promote the employer's prof-
its by replacing adversarial employee relations with a cooperative ap-
proach of eliciting employees' hard work, attention to quality, and or-
ganizational loyalty through more humane and scientific methods.9 In
addition to establishing high wages, employment security, written per-
sonnel policies, and supervisor training, these companies sought to pro-
mote employee participation and a sense of fair dealing by creating shop
committees, works councils, and employee representation plans. Billed as
a nonunion form of "industrial democracy," these representational struc-
tures were typically established, operated, and financed by the company
and were limited in coverage to a particular department, plant, or com-
pany. They provided for periodic joint meetings between elected worker
representatives and selected management representatives, and purport-
edly promoted improved communication, problem-solving, and dispute
resolution with respect to both production and employment issues. The
representational structures emphasized conciliation, cooperation, and
mutual gain over adversarialism, distributive bargaining, and win-lose
outcomes.20
The heyday of this form of nonunion industrial democracy was the
1920s, an historical period now commonly referred to as the "welfare
capitalism" era, when several hundred medium-large employers primarily
in the progressive, liberal wing of the business community established
18. This policy is described in COHEN, supra note 17, at 159-211; SANFORD JACOBY,
EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1945, at 133-65 (1985); Bruce E. Kaufman, The Case for the Com-
pany Union, in LAB. HIST. (forthcoming, 2000); Bruce E. Kaufman, The Theory and Practice of
Strategic HRM and Participative Management: Antecedents in Early Industrial Relations, HRM
REV. (forthcoming, 2000).
19. See, e.g., WILijAM BASSET, WHEN THE WORKMEN HELP YOU MANAGE (1919); JOHN
R. COMMONS, INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL (1919). The development of progressive personnel
management in the early 1920s is also discussed in Bruce E. Kaufman, John R. Commons: His
Contributions to the Founding and Early Development of the Field of Personnel/HRM, 1
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 50TH ANNUAL
MEETING 328 (1998).
20. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, EXPERIENCE WITH WORKS
COUNCILS IN THE UNITED STATES, Research Report No. 50, at 4-13 (1922); Kaufman, Prior to
the Wagner Act, supra note 1411; Nelson, supra note 14.
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representation plans covering a total of more than one million workers.2'
In effect, these employers put in place an early forerunner of today's
much-touted "high-performance workplace" and the employee represen-
tation plans of this period were the structure used by employers to pro-
mote a 1920s style of employee involvement and participation. 2 Al-
though often disparaged today as "shams,"' 3  the better-run
representation plans, according to informed observers at the time,
achieved notable advances in efficiency and productivity for companies
and humane and generous employment practices and conditions for em-
ployees.24 These observers also noted that it was unlikely that trade un-
ions would organize these progressive, leading-edge companies during
this period, so that it was largely the prospect of mutual gain, rather than
union avoidance, that was the most important motivating force behind
the establishment and proliferation of the nonunion employee represen-
tation plans.2s
In mid-1929, shortly before the Great Depression, most expert ob-
servers believed that the welfare capitalism HRM model was both a
firmly ensconced and a largely praiseworthy innovation in progressive
employment relations. Nonunion employee representation plans were
21. See BRANDES, supra note 17; DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 48-
81 (1980); SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPrrALISM SINCE THE NEw
DEAL 11-34 (1997); Nelson, supra note 14, at 338.
22. On high performance workplaces, see THOMAS KOCHAN & PAUL OSTERMAN, THE
MUTUAL GAINS ENTERPRISE (1994); COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 29-57. The role of company unions as a method of
promoting cooperative, win-win outcomes is described by William Leiserson:
The unskilled and semi-skilled working people of this country, in the last six years,
have obtained more of the things... out of employee representation plans than they
have out of the organized labor movement.... There is even evidence that these
workers sometimes deliberately prefer company unions to the regular trade unions.
The reason is that they think employee representation is doing what the unions have
failed to do.
William Leiserson, The Accomplishments and Significance of Employee Representation, 4
PERSONNEL 119, 127 (1928).
23. GITELMAN, supra note 16, at 333; Paul Sultan, (A)(2) Brutus? The Perils and Promises
of the TEAM Act, 47 LAB. L.J. 498, 499 (1996) (stating that even proponents of the TEAM Act
agree that company unions "were admittedly bogus or sham structures").
24. See William Leiserson, Contributions of Personnel Management to Improved Labor
Relations, in WERTHEIM LEcTuRES ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 125-64 (1929); Sumner
Slichter, The Current Labor Policies of American Industries, Q.J. ECON. 393 (1929); see also
ERNEST BURTON, EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION (1926); Bruce Kaufman, Nonunion Employee
Representation in the United States, supra note 11. In a retrospective look at the company union
established at the Thompson Products Company, Jacoby concludes, "[t]his study of company
unionism calls into question the usual characterization of company unions as uniformaly ineffec-
five and short-lived.... they evolved into organizations that effectively met their members
needs." Sanford M. Jacoby, Reckoning with Company Unions: The Case of Thompson Products,
1934-1964, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 19, 19 (1989); see also David Fairris, From Exit to
Voice in Shopfioor Governance: The Case of Company Unions, 69 BUS. HIST. REv. 493 (1995)
(finding that company unions improved workplace safety and productivity).
25. See Leiserson, supra note 24, at 156-58.
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often regarded as the crown jewel of this new FIRM model and, despite
their admitted shortcomings, were hailed as a notable advance over both
the traditional nonunion model of industrial autocracy and the union
model of collective bargaining.26 It is paradoxical, therefore, that six short
years later the welfare capitalism HRM model lay in tatters, with its
promise of progressive win-win employment relations largely discredited
and its crown jewel-the nonunion employee representation plans-
outlawed by the newly enacted National Labor Relations Act. The ex-
planation for this turnabout is found in the events of the Great Depres-
sion and, particularly, in the macroeconomic recovery program adopted
by the newly elected administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt
in the summer of 1933.7
Roosevelt believed that the Great Depression was caused by a grow-
ing imbalance between aggregate supply and demand.u Profits grew far
faster than wages during the 1920s and the result was over-investment in
both physical and financial capital and a concomitant shortfall in house-
hold income and purchasing power. In late 1929 the bubble burst, re-
flected in the crash of the stock market and a precipitous decline in
spending and production. Although many firms quickly instituted wage
cuts and layoffs, the welfare capitalist firms made great efforts to protect
their costly investments in employee loyalty and goodwill by maintaining
wages, avoiding layoffs through work-sharing, and cutting a host of non-
26. See id.; Brody, supra note 16, at 55 (stating that employee representation was "the most
celebrated experiment of the decade"); Kaufman, Prior to the Wagner Act, supra note 1411. Il-
lustrative is the following statement of Robert Bruere, associate editor of the liberal magazine
of public opinion, The Survey, and a card carrying trade-unionist, after an in-depth investigation
of the employee representation plan at General Electric's West Lynn, Massachusetts, plant.
By contrast with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America [cited by Bruere as
the trade union doing the most to promote labor-management cooperation and in-
creased efficiency in production], the organization of the General Electric employes
under the Plan of Representation in West Lynn-without dues, without a treasury,
without its own technical staff, without the essentials of free initiative except in matters
of recreation and grievances-makes the impression of a bottle-fed and company cra-
dled organization. And yet, as I have said, the scope of the activities which have been
developed under the Plan is so much wider than the scope of the activities ordinarily
developed under trade union collective agreements that it is worth much not only to
the employes at West Lynn but to the labor movement in general that this particular
infant should be bottle-fed. The General Electric [sic] is maintaining at West Lynn a
"service test station" which may make as a great contribution to the technique of in-
dustrial relations as its physical research laboratories have made and are making to the
technique and development of the electrical industry.
West Lynn, THE SURVEY, Apr. 1, 1926, at 27.
27. The following account of the Great Depression and the origins of the Wagner Act
comes from Kaufman, supra note 7. See also Kenneth Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Inter-
view with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 MIAM L. Rnv. 285-363 (1987); Key-
serling, supra note 6.
28. See generally DANIEL FUSFELD, THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEw DEAL (1956).
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labor costs. 29 In late 1931, however, the welfare capitalist firms were
forced by a sea of red ink to initiate wage cuts, large-scale layoffs, pro-
duction speed-ups, and more draconian supervision of labor in order to
survive-a decision that precipitated yet further cuts and layoffs and a
gradual demoralization and embitterment of labor. One consequence was
a loss of faith among American workers in the integrity of employers and
their ability to honor prior commitments of high wages, job security, and
fair treatment.30 A second consequence of the downward spiral in the
economy and employment conditions was a palpable sense of panic in the
country and a conviction that some type of extraordinary emergency
measure had to be adopted if complete collapse was to be avoided.
In that spirit, the Roosevelt Administration launched in June 1933
one of the most hastily conceived yet revolutionary economic programs
ever promulgated in this nation's history-the National Industrial Re-
covery Act ("NIRA").3" The NIRA sought to stop the deflationary
downward spiral of production, wages, and prices and to promote long-
run economic recovery by stabilizing the wage/price structure and aug-
menting household income and purchasing power through a redistribu-
tion of income from profits to wages. Several methods were adopted to
achieve these ends. 2 One was the suspension of the antitrust laws so that
companies, acting in concert through trade associations, could set prices
and sales quotas in written "codes of fair competition."33 A second was to
require companies to specify, in those codes, minimum wage rates and
maximum hours of work.3 A third was to encourage the formation of
trade unions and the spread of collective bargaining, on the theory that
the collective bargaining power of unions would be able to raise wages
and improve labor conditions and thus contribute to the stabilization of
wages and prices and the redistribution of income.35
The NIRA sought to promote greater unionization through its now-
famous section 7(a). The handiwork of Senator Robert Wagner and al-
lies, section 7(a) stated:
Every code of fair competition... shall contain the following conditions: (1)
That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the in-
terference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
29. See BRODY, supra note 21, at 67-78.
30. See BRODY, supra note 21, at 75-78; COHEN, supra note 17, at 238-46.
31. Pub. L. No. 73-67,48 Stat. 195 (1933).
32. See generally Kaufman, supra note 7, at 37-47.
33. CHARLES Roos, NIRA ECONOMIC PLANNING 37-47 (1937).
34. See id. at 172-78.
35. See GRANT N. FARR, THE ORIGINS OF RECENT LABOR POLICY (1959).
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designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining .... 36
In response to the NIRA, over one million workers rushed to join
unions. Workers joined unions partly out of a self-interested desire for
improved wages and conditions and partly out of a sense of patriotic
duty-to promote the President's economic recovery plan-and desire to
be represented in the ongoing code-making process in Washington, D.C.,
particularly with regard to the setting of industry wage rates and work
hours.37
At the same time as union organizing spread across the land, hun-
dreds of nonunion employers rushed to set up some form of employee
representation plan. Part of their motive was to comply with what was
widely perceived at the time, mistakenly, as the NIRA's mandate that all
firms adopt some form of collective bargaining.3 Also operating was the
palpable fear among employers of being caught up in the sudden onrush
of union organizing. To avoid unionization, employers fought back with a
variety of weapons, such as firing union activists, preemptively increasing
wages, and refusing to bargain.9 In addition, a widely used weapon was
the hasty founding of a nonunion representation plan or "company un-
ion."4 Indeed, within a twenty-four month period, over one thousand
new representation plans were established, covering approximately 2.5
million workers. Unlike the representation plans established in the
1920s by the liberal/progressive employers, the great majority of these
new representation plans were motivated first and foremost by anti-
unionism animus, rather than the hope of mutual gain from a coopera-
tive, high-involvement employment relations strategy. Accordingly, these
plans were widely condemned by supporters of the New Deal not only as
36. NIRA, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 198 (1933). The role of Senator Wagner in the drafting of the
NIRA, and section 7(a) in particular, is discussed in FARR, supra note 35, at 69-94; Kaufman,
supra note 7, at 39-47.
37. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 48-51. Writing in 1934, economist David McCabe stated
in this regard that "the Recovery Act has to date given less impetus to organization for collec-
tive bargaining... than to organization for political action." The Effects of the Recovery Act
upon Labor Organization, 49 Q.J. ECON. 52,77 (1934).
38. See DALE YODER, PERSONNEL AND LABOR RELATIONS 477 (1938) ("The Act was
widely described as having made collective bargaining compulsory."). In order to comply with
this perceived mandate, many employers restructured their employee representation plans so
they had features similar to bona fide trade unions, such as a written constitutions and elected
officers, and began to refer to them as agencies for collective bargaining. See DIVISION OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 14. This proved to be a major mistake, however, for it
transformed the stated purpose of the plans from employee involvement to collective bargain-
ing-a function they were never intended to perform and for which they were indeed subject to
all the limitations cited by their critics (for example, lack of bargaining power and domination
by the employer).
39. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENTYEARS 217-317 (1970).
40. See id. at 39-40.
41. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 293-94; Nelson, supra note 14, at 338.
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a sham of collective bargaining and industrial democracy but also as a di-
rect threat to the success of the President's economic recovery program-
dependent as it was on raising wages and purchasing power.42
In 1934 Senator Wagner began to draft new legislation that spelled
out in greater detail labor's section 7(a) rights to organize and protec-
tions thereof. His first point of attack was to propose a legal ban on com-
pany-created employee representation plans. His rationale for doing so
was clearly stated in a New York Times article published on March 11,
1934. In it, Senator Wagner wrote:
The company union... runs antithetical to the very core of the New Deal
philosophy. Business men are being allowed to pool their information and
experience in vast trade associations in order to make a concerted drive
against the evil features of modem industrialism. They have been permitted
to recognize values of unity and the destructive tendencies of discrete activi-
ties and to act accordingly. If employees are denied similar privileges, they
not only are unable to uphold their end of the labor bargain; in addition they
can not cope with any problems that transcend the boundaries of a single
business. The company union has improved personal relations, group-welfare
activities, discipline, and other matters which may be handled on a local ba-
sis. But it has failed dismally to standardize or improve wage levels, for the
wage question is a general one whose sweep embraces whole industries, or
States, or even the Nation. Without wider areas of cooperation among em-
ployees there can be no protection against the nibbling tactics of the unfair
employer or of the worker who is willing to degrade standards by serving for
a pittance.
43
Thus, Wagner-one of the most ardent foes of company unions-
admits that they help improve in-plant employment conditions and em-
ployer-employee relations but nonetheless defends banning them be-
cause the fact that they cover only a single plant or company prevents
them from taking wages out of competition the way a trade union can if it
organizes all firms in the relevant product market and bargains for a uni-
form wage scale. Put another way, Wagner justified a ban on nonunion
employee representation plans because, in his view, they retarded the
process of macroeconomic recovery from the Great Depression.
42. For example, in his congressional testimony, Senator Wagner stated:
The greatest obstacles to collective bargaining are employer-dominated unions, which
have multiplied with amazing rapidity since enactment of the recovery law. Such a
union makes a sham of equal bargaining power by restricting employee cooperation to
a single employer unit at a time when business men are allowed to band together in
large groups. It deprives workers of the wider cooperation which is necessary, not only
to uphold their own end of the labor bargain but to stabilize and standardize wage lev-
els, to cope with the sweatshop and the exploiter, and to exercise their proper voice in
economic affairs.
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, supra note 9, at 15.
43. Reprinted in id. at 22-26.
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Despite heated opposition from business groups, Wagner's view pre-
vailed and was incorporated into the NLRA, as enacted into law in 1935.
The two key parts of the NLRA (as amended), as they pertain to com-
pany unions, are sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5). Section 8(a)(2) of the Act de-
clares it an unfair labor practice, "to dominate or interfere with the for-
mation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it.... ."44
Section 2(5) defines a labor organization very broadly as:
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rate of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work.
45
The effect of these two provisions is to outlaw any kind of employee
representational body that is: (a) created, operated, and/or financed by
the employer, and (b) engages in some kind of bilateral dealing with the
employer over one or more aspects of the terms and conditions of em-
ployment.
By the end of World War II, the strictures against company unions
contained in sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2), coupled with rulings of the Su-
preme Court that upheld both the overall constitutionality of the Act46
and a series of disestablishment orders issued by the National Labor Re-
lations Board against individual employers who operated company un-
ions,47 led to a virtual disappearance of nonunion employee representa-
tion plans in American industry.4 Many employers disbanded their
nonunion representation committees, and others facilitated the transfor-
mation of their company unions into independent local unions, while
other company unions were taken over or displaced by national and in-
ternational unions in NLRB representation elections.
Over the next forty years, the NLRA's ban on employer-sponsored
employee representation committees generated a modest number of new
cases before the NLRB and courts, some of which resulted in a revision
or reinterpretation of certain aspects of section 2(5) and 8(a)(2) but none
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
46. See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
47. See, e.g., NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939);
NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
48. The demise of company unions from 1935-1945 is described in Sanford Jacoby, Unnatu-
ral Extinction: The Rise and Fall of the Local Independent Union, 1935-1970, in NONUNION
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11.
49. See id.; Sanford Jacoby & Anil Verma, Enterprise Unions in the United States, INDus.
REL, Winter 1992, at 137.
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of which affected fundamental change.r Just as section 8(a)(2) occa-
sioned relatively little litigation and debate in legal circles between 1950
and 1980 the subject of company unions passed from a central issue in
academic industrial relations to a marginal area of interest explored
largely by scholars in the field of labor history.1 Beginning in the 1980s,
however, new developments in management thought, human resource
practices, and the competitive position of American industry unexpect-
edly brought sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA back to a place of
prominence and contention. 2
Although the progressive wing of employers in the 1920s had already
discovered the conceptual principles and practical advantages of em-
ployee involvement and participation, these insights largely lay fallow un-
til rediscovered and popularized in the 1960s and 1970s by behavioral sci-
entists in academia and leading-edge employers in industry. 3 Writings by
management theorists such as Douglas McGregor, Chris Argyris, and
Frederick Herzberg extolled the productivity and performance payoffs
from using forms of work motivation that appeal to positive human
needs, such as the desire to have jobs that are interesting, provide oppor-
tunities for decisioumaking, and promote social interaction." Equally in-
fluential was the development of the sociotechnical theory of work sys-
tems by Eric Trist and colleagues.5 Trist argues that every work process
is made up of a technical system and a social system and that peak pro-
ductivity is achieved when the design of jobs takes into account human
social needs. This is in stark contrast to the design of organizations in-
50. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition:
The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 125-49
(1994) [hereinafter Estreicher, "Company Union" Prohibition]; Samuel Estreicher, Nonunion
Employee Representation: A Legal/Policy Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRE-
SENTATION, supra note 11 [hereinafter Estreicher, Nonunion Employee Representation].
51. Studies on company unions in the 1920s and 1930s include BURTON, supra note 24;
LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT (Alfred Bernheim & Dorothy Van Doren eds., 1935); EARL
MILLER, WORKMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN INDUSTRIAL GOVERNMENT (1922); Leiserson, su-
pra note 22; and Leiserson, supra note 24. Contemporary historical works include BRANDES,
supra note 17; COHEN, supra note 17; GITELMAN, supra note 16; and Nelson, supra note 14. In
contrast, the only article on company unions featured in the scholarly industrial relations jour-
nal Industrial and Labor Relations Review over the period 1987-1997 was in a symposium on
labor history.
52. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra
note 1.
53. See generally DANIEL A. WREN, THE EVOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT THOUGHT (4th
ed. 1994) (providing a history of management thought regarding employee involvement and
participation).
54. See, e.g., CHRIS ARGYRIS, PERSONALITY AND ORGANIZATION (1957); FREDERICK
HERZBERG, WORK AND THE NATURE OF MAN (1966); DOUGLAS McGREGOR, THE HUMAN
SIDE OF ENTERPRISE (1960).
55. See ERIC TRIST, THE EVOLUTION OF SOCiO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK AND AN ACTION RESEARCH PROGRAM (Occasional Paper No. 2, Ontario Qual-
ity of Working Life Centre, 1981).
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spired by Frederick Taylor's theory of scientific management, according
to which jobs are designed solely to take advantage of economies of scale
and division of labor and the psychological needs of workers are ig-
nored. 6 These theoretical insights were applied in industry, beginning
with a small number of pioneering experiments in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.7 Often referred to as a "high-performance work place"
model, these new plants featured work teams, gain sharing, extensive in-
formation sharing, reduced management hierarchy and control, an egali-
tarian work culture, and-of most relevance for this article-high levels
of employee involvement and participation in management decision-
making. 8
Since the mid-1980s the high performance work place model has been
adopted by a growing number of firms, spurred by the pressures of
greater domestic and global competition, the desire of companies to
achieve greater flexibility and economies in production, and this model's
demonstrable record of facilitating greater profitability and higher qual-
ity. 9 Another complementary influence during this period was the intro-
duction of "lean" production methods from Japan, such as just-in-time
inventory and "kaizen" quality improvement methods.60 This model also
makes heavy use of EIP techniques. Finally, while many American com-
panies have not yet implemented the entire package of high-performance
practices, they have nevertheless adopted parts of the model, including,
in a number of cases, various types of EIP programs. As reviewed in
more detail in Part III of this Article, one or more forms of high-
involvement work practice are now found in the great majority of me-
dium- and large-sized firms in this country.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY
This Part examines the controversy surrounding the NLRB's Elec-
tromation decision. The discussion is divided into two sections: first, a
summary of the conflicting points of view concerning the legal merits and
consequences of the Electromation decision and, second, an overview of
56. See generally B.J. HODGE ET AL., ORGANIZATION THEORY: A STRATEGIC APPROACH
19-20 (1996) (discussing the implications of scientific management for organizational design);
FREDERICK TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911).
57. See DESIGN OF JOBS: SELECTED READINGS (Louis Davis & James Taylor eds., 1972)
58. See David A. Nadler & Marc S. Gerstein, Designing High-Performance Work Systems:
Organization, People, Work, Technology, and Information, in ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHI-
TECTuRE at 110 (David S. Nadler et al. eds., 1992) (describing the high performance workplace
model).
59. See Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, supra note 1, at 45-
47; see also Kaufman, supra note 2.
60. See DAVID WOMACK ET AL, THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (1990)
(describing the model of lean production).
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the evidence and conclusions from previously published academic re-
search on this matter.
A. Contours of the Legal Debate
The Electromation case and its progeny have sparked national con-
troversy and debate concerning their allegedly harmful impact on the
ability of nonunion companies to establish and operate EIP programs.
The different sides in this debate are briefly described below.
All sides of the Electromation debate agree that government policy
should facilitate greater employee involvement and participation in
managerial decisionmaking.6' All sides also recognize that employee in-
volvement and participation cannot be done in an organizational vac-
uum; rather, successful EIP requires various organizational structures
within the firm that allow employees to meet, discuss problems among
themselves and with their managers, identify problem areas and brain-
storm solutions, and exercise greater day-to-day influence in decision-
making and plant operations. Particularly in firms of more than 200 em-
ployees, direct forms of employee involvement that would enable all
employees to meet as a group and have an equal voice are too cumber-
some and costly, which is why employers typically turn to some form of
indirect or representational EIP structure. In such structures, a subset of
employees represent their peers in meetings and discussions with man-
agement. 62
But it is at this point that nonunion employers run into the constraints
of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, as recently highlighted by the
Electromation decision. The NLRA does not forbid all forms of em-
ployee representation committees and plans, only those that in some way
deal with issues concerning the terms and conditions of employment. The
complaint of employers, however, is that the operation of EIP programs,
inevitably leads to discussions of terms and conditions of employment be-
tween employees and managers. How is it possible, they ask, to foster
meaningful employee involvement and participation, or even discuss
production and quality issues, when subjects such as safety, work sched-
ules, pay incentives and bonuses, and grievances have to be avoided?63
61. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note
1, at 30.
62. See COTTON, supra note 2, at 114-40.
63. In recent Senate testimony on section 8(a)(2), for example, J. Thomas Bouchard, Senior
Vice President of IBM, stated:
Yet for non-union companies [like] ours, under our National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), certain workplace subjects are "off limits" for teams of employees, such as
those involving wages, hours, working conditions, dispute resolution and health and
safety ....
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Proponents and critics of Electromation have coalesced into three dif-
ferent groups regarding the answer to this question.
The first position taken by the critics is that section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA poses a serious threat to cooperative employee relations and eco-
nomic competitiveness and needs to be revised or deleted altogether.
4
Critics note that nearly ninety percent of American workers in the pri-
vate sector workplace are unorganized; that nonunion employers are in-
creasingly utilizing EIP programs to foster higher productivity, quality,
and job satisfaction; and that the Electromation decision calls into ques-
tion the legality of many of these programs.6' Indicative of these senti-
ments is the following statement of William Buddinger, Chairman and
CEO of Rodel, Inc., to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources in testimony on the impact of section 8(a)(2) on employers:
A modification of the NLRA to allow teamwork and collaborative manage-
ment is clearly needed.... The modem experiments in teamwork have gen-
erally produced the best of two worlds-more competitive enterprises and
happier workers.... American enterprise must be free to change.... We
cannot to that if we are shackled by laws that lock us into the past.
In response to concerns such as these, Representative Steve Gunder-
son and Senator Nancy Kassebaum introduced legislation in 1993 called
the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act, which sought to mod-
ify section 8(a)(2) by adding the following proviso:
Provided further, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under this paragraph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain,
or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which employees
participate, to discuss matters of mutual interest, including issues of quality,
productivity and efficiency, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority
to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements with the employer
Some argue that teams would typically not work on those subjects anyway, or
shouldn't, and that the NLRA does not interfere with the team's ability to address
subjects of product quality, efficiency and productivity.
But as a direct result of recent National Labor Relations Board decisions on teams
and employee involvement plans, we have reviewed a number of IBM ideas on team-
work and have had to impose restrictions on teams in order not to run afoul of the
law--even though those teams made good business and common sense.
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997 Hearings on S. 295 Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Congress (1997).
64. See, e.g., Raymond Hogler, Employee Involvement and Electromation, Inc.: An Analy-
sis for Statutory Change, 44 LABOR L.J. 261 (1993); Michele Maryott, Participate at Your Peril:
The Need for Resolution of the Conflict Surrounding Employee Participation Programs by the
TEAM Act of 1997,24 PEPP. L. REv. 1291 (1997).
65. See, e.g., James Gibson, Total Quality Management, An NLRB Ruling Threatens the
Nascent "Employee Involvement" Movement, THE NEw DEMOCRAT, Nov. 1993, at 25, 25-26.
Data on union membership in the private sector for 1997 are from BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 217, tbl.42 (Jan.
1998).
66. Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 295 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Congress (1997).
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or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between the employer
and any labor organization.
6 7
The Team Act died in committee in 1993, was re-submitted in 1995,
and was passed by both houses of Congress in 1996, only to be vetoed by
President Clinton. It was re-introduced in 1997 in significantly amended
form but was not reported out of committee. 69
The second position regarding the alleged harmfulness of the Elec-
tromation decision is articulated by a subset of the decision's critics. They
express firm opposition to any relaxation of section 8(a)(2) on the
grounds that doing so will once again open the door to sham company
unions, thereby providing employers with another tool to subvert work-
ers' rights to join a union and engage in collective bargaining.70 Collective
bargaining, they argue, provides an effective method for genuine power
sharing and employee involvement in company operations. Thus, public
policy should encourage rather than restrict the ability of workers to ob-
tain union representation. In this vein, Jonathan Matt, general counsel of
the AFL-CIO, stated in congressional testimony on the TEAM Act that
"this bill has been devised to allow employers to establish and maintain
employer-dominated systems of employee representation in the work-
place-and to wield them to discourage or defeat the formation of truly
independent workplace representatives: unions.",
71
The third position taken by the critics of Electromation (sometimes
also in conjunction with the second position just described) is that the
NLRA does not in fact significantly constrain the ability of nonunion
companies to operate legitimate EIP programs and that the cries of alarm
67. S. 669,103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 1529,103d Cong. (1993).
68. See Maryott, supra note 64.
69. The TEAM Act bill introduced in 1997 was different in several respects from the initial
bill of 1993. H.R. 634, introduced on February 6, 1997, reads as follows:
Provided further, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor prac-
tice... for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization
or entity of any kind, in which employees participate... to at least the same extent
practicable as representatives of management participate, to address matters of mutual
interest, including, but not limited to, issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, and
safety and health, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bar-
gaining agreements between the employer and any labor organization, except that in a
case in which a labor organization is the representative of such employees as provided
in section 9(a), this proviso shall not apply.
H.R. 634,105th Cong. (1997).
70. See, e.g., Owen Herrnstadt, Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA: The Debate, 48 LABOR L.J. 98
(1997); Charles Morris, Deja Vu and 8(a)(2): What's Really Being Chilled by Electromation?, 4
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 25 (1994); A.B. Cochrane, III, We Participate, They Decide: The
Real Stakes in Revising Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 16 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 458 (1995).
71. See Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 295 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Congress (1997).
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over Electromation decision are vastly overblown. 72 After a review of all
section 8(a)(2) cases decided by the Board between 1972 and 1993, for
example, James Rundle concluded that "[tihere is absolutely no evidence
that the NLRB has ever in the past twenty-two years disestablished a
committee of the type employers say they must have to be competitive.
' ' 3
This position rests on a combination of two arguments. One is that the
NLRA does not restrict the ability of employers to set up teams and
other forms of employee involvement structures for purposes of pro-
moting increased efficiency and quality, since these employer-created
bodies are in no way prohibited by section 8(a)(2) so long as they focus
on production-related subjects and avoid issues relating to the terms and
conditions of employment.74 The second is that, because over the last two
decades there have been relatively few section 8(a)(2) cases brought
against employers, the probability of an employer's EIP program running
afoul of the law is quite small.75
B. Evidence from Past Research
Determining which of the three legal positions on section 8(a)(2) de-
scribed above is correct is fundamentally an empirical issue and can only
be resolved by examining current EIP practices of American employers
and the effect of the NLRA on them. Accordingly, described below is a
summary of the findings of relevant past research on the extent of EIP
programs in industry and the potential constraint placed on the structure
and operation of these programs by the NLRA.
A problem with considering past studies is that authors adopt differ-
ent definitions of what practices constitute employee involvement and
participation and the types of workplace employee groups that are in-
cluded as EIP bodies. In evaluating the findings of this literature, there-
fore, it is important first to define EIP clearly and to stipulate the types of
organizational structures that constitute EIP programs.
As discussed in more detail in Part IV of this Article, EIP programs
vary considerably in terms of the workplace issues dealt with, the struc-
ture of the program, and the power given to employees. At its most gen-
eral level, however, the essence of employee involvement and participa-
72. See, e.g., Dennis Devaney, Much Ado About Section 8(a)(2): The NLRB and Workplace
Cooperation After Electromation and DuPont, 23 STETSON L. REv. 39 (1993); James Rundle,
The Debate over the Ban on Employer-Dominated Labor Organizations: What is the Evidence?,
in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 16, at 161.
73. Rundle, supra note 72, at 173.
74. Dennis Devaney, Electromation and DuPont- The Next Generation, 4 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 3, 6 (1994).
75. See Rundle, supra note 72, at 166 (finding that between 1983 and 1993 the NLRB or-
dered fewer than two employeee committees disestablished per year).
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tion is a decision made by management to share with employees a greater
amount of decisionmaking responsibility, information, and financial re-
wards. 76 This may take the form of a suggestion box, an annual town hall
meeting with employees, self-managed work teams, a peer-review dis-
pute-resolution panel, a plant-wide employee committee, or a variety of
other devices. Further, an EIP program may be instituted as a relatively
autonomous, stand-alone human resource management practice, or as
part of a larger, more comprehensive high-performance work system. Al-
though definitions of a "high-performance" workplace differ, one expert
on the matter identifies eight key components: self-managed work teams;
enlarged jobs that include a whole task; flexibility in work assignments;
the delegation of motivating, coordinating and controlling tasks from su-
pervisors to workers; wide dissemination of production and financial in-
formation; some form of gain-sharing reward system; substantial invest-
ment in training of employees in social and production skills; and
reduction of status differentials and enhancement of trust between man-
agement and shopfloor workers.77
Given this enumeration, it appears that EIP programs are relatively
widespread among medium- to large-sized firms and that the proportion
of firms with these programs is growing over time. A study in the late
1980s of 495 large firms by John Delaney, David Lewin, and Casey Ich-
niowski, for example, found that 43% of nonunion production workers in
manufacturing were involved in some form of EIP program.78 According
to a survey done in 1994, that statistic had increased substantially. The
survey found that 75% of all employers used employee involvement pro-
grams and 96% of employers with 5000 or more employees did so.7 '9 The
breadth and depth of EIP activities apparently varies a great deal, how-
ever. For example, a study by Edward Lawler, Gerald Ledford and Susan
Albers found that of 313 large companies with EIP programs, roughly
one-third had what they classified as a "low" level of EIP, based on the
extent of sharing of information, rewards, training opportunities, and
power, while another one-third exhibited an "average" level and another
76. See LAWLER, supra note 2, at 31.
77. See Richard Walton, Innovative Restructuring at Work, in THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY,
COLUMBIA UNIvERSrrY, THE WORKER AND THE JOB: COPING WITH CHANGE 145, 151-59
(1974).
78. See JOHN THOMAS DELANEY ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HUMAN RE-
SOURCE POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN AMERICAN FIRMS 59 (1989).
79. See AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION ET AL., THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 3 (1994) (on file with the author)
(describing a survey conducted by the Aerospace Industries Association, Electronic Industries
Association, Labor Policy Association, National Manufacturers Association, and Organization
Resources Counselors, Inc.).
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7% a "high" level." The EIP programs in 26% of these companies either
could not be classified or relied principally on a sharing of financial re-
wards. A study by Paul Osterman concluded that, while over one-half of
companies with fifty or more employees had some form of EIP program,
only 37% were "transformed" in the sense that they had adopted two or
more flexible work organization initiatives often associated with high-
performance workplaces.8'
As indicated in Part II of this Article, only those EIP programs that
are representative in nature and feature bilateral dealing with manage-
ment on terms and conditions of employment fall under the restrictions
of the NLRA. In gauging the constraints imposed by the NLRA, there-
fore, it is important to differentiate between alternative types of EIP pro-
grams and structures. No one source exists with the data to permit quan-
tification of varying types of EIP programs and structures, but suggestive
evidence can be pieced together from several studies.
It appears that the proportion of companies that use various types of
nonrepresentational EIP structures focused on production and quality
issues is larger than the proportion that relies on representational em-
ployee committees and councils. (An exception to this statement, as
noted below, concerns joint safety committees.) The Lawler, Ledford,
and Albers study cited above, for example, found that 66% of firms with
EIP programs had a quality circle and 47% had self-managed work teams
(both typically include all workers in the relevant work group and are
thus not representational in nature).s Similarly, the survey by Osterman
found that 53% of companies used a form of employee teams and 41% of
companies operated quality circles.3
Employee representation committees are less frequently found. A na-
tionwide survey of employees conducted in 1996 by Noah Meltz and
Seymour Lipset found, for example, that, while 50% of nonunion em-
ployees said that they worked in companies with some type of EIP pro-
gram, only 20% of them said that their companies also had a formal sys-
tem of nonunion representation.s'
Another piece of evidence concerning the extent of formal employee
committees comes from a survey of employees at 16 companies by the
80. See LAWLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 32.
81. See Paul Osterman, How Common Is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts It?,
47 INDuS. & LAB. REL REV. 173,178 (1994).
82. See LAWLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 27-28.
83. See Osterman, supra note 81, at 177.
84. See Noah Meltz & Seymour Martin Lipset, Extent of Nonunion Employee Representa-
tion in Canada and the United States, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note
11.
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consulting firm Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. ("IRC").85 Over
one-half (53%) of employees reported that they were members of some
type of departmental work group, but only 11% said that they partici-
pated in an employee committee, and only 15% said that they partici-
pated in a joint employer-employee committee.
Finally, in a 1994 survey by Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, 52%
of workers said that their company had an employee involvement pro-
gram, and 47% said that the company had an annual town hall meeting,
but only 37% reported the presence of a "committee of employees that
discusses problems with management on a regular basis.""" Also of inter-
est vis-A-vis the section 8(a)(2) debate is the finding in this study that
28% of the nonunion workers in EIP programs reported that the commit-
tees discussed wage and benefit issues as well as production issues.Y The
one type of employee representation committee that seems to be quite
common is a joint safety committee. The National Safety Council, for ex-
ample, estimated that 56% of nonunion workplaces in 1993 had some
form of employee safety committee.8
The final piece of evidence on the prevalence of EIP programs, and
the constraining effect of the NLRA, comes from two studies by Michael
LeRoy. 9 LeRoy's articles are noteworthy because, among the welter of
law review articles on the Electromation decision (and subsequent NLRB
cases, such as DuPont), 90 they are the only ones to present new primary
data on the representational structure and function of EIP teams and
committees. For this reason, and because he was invited to present the
findings of his research before the Senate Committee on Labor and Hu-
man Resources in hearings on the TEAM Act, LeRoy's work deserves
particular attention.
In his first study, LeRoy collected data in early 1995 on twenty-three
nonunion work teams. The evidence indicated that: (1) most work teams
were small, with more than one-half comprising fewer than twenty work-
ers; (2) almost half of the teams only made suggestions to management
and thus did not "deal with" employers as required for a section 2(5)
85. See 5 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COUNSELORS, INC., REPORT OF THE IRC SURvEY OF
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT, at BI (1994).
86. RIcHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (forthcoming, 1999).
87. See id. at 102.
88. See Devaney, supra note 74, at 16.
89. See Michael H. LeRoy, Can TEAM Work? Implications of an Electromation and
DuPont Compliance Analysis for the TEAM Act, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 215 (1996)
[hereinafter Leroy, Can TEAM Work?]; Michael H. LeRoy, "Dealing With" Employee In-
volvement in Nonunion Workplaces: Empirical Research Implications for the TEAM Act and
Electromation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 31 (1997) [hereinafter LeRoy, Empirical Research
Implications].
90. NLRB v. E.I. DuPont & Co., 311 NLRB 893 (1993).
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violation; (3) most teams handled work process or product quality issues
and thus also remained within the legal ambit of section 2(5); and (4)
two-thirds of the teams were created by management, indicating that the
large majority would be considered "dominated" in the sense prohibited
by section 8(a)(2) if they were also section 2(5) labor organizations.9" He
concludes from these findings that, "the work teams surveyed here were
very different from company unions of the 1930s," and that "three-
fourths of the teams appear to comply with Electromation and DuPont."
92
The results of LeRoy's first study support proponents of the third po-
sition espoused by some critics of Electromation, which is to say that the
Electromation decision appears not to be a binding constraint on most
smaller-scale EIP groups because they focus solely on production and
quality issues. These conclusions are in some respects challenged by
findings in his second, expanded study, however. In this study, com-
pleted in 1997, LeRoy surveyed six more Fortune 500 companies but ex-
amined a larger sample of nonunion teams-seventy-eight-and mod-
estly revised his survey questionnaire in light of several post-
Electromation section 8(a)(2) decisions by the NLRB. Analysis of the
survey results indicated: (1) average team size continues to be small, with
89% of teams in this survey comprising twenty or fewer workers; (2)
roughly one-half to two-thirds of the teams had bilateral "dealings with"
management in the sense prohibited by section 8(a)(2); (3) the primary
subject area of 82% of the teams consisted of production and work proc-
ess issues; (4) over one-half of the teams also dealt with work scheduling,
safety, and accident prevention, although only one-quarter or fewer dealt
with other aspects of employment policy (such as pay and grievances);
and (5) nearly all teams were created by management, and, for three-
quarters of the teams, management plays at least some role in directing
their activities.
Based on these results, LeRoy again concludes that "these findings
reveal no evidence of company unions"94 and that "[e]mployer domina-
tion of teams has changed little, if at all, compared to the first survey."
95
LeRoy noted nevertheless that "[t]hese teams [in the second survey],
compared to those in my first compliance survey, are much more likely to
be found to be statutory labor organizations under the NLRA because
they deal with employers over a wider variety of workplace issues, such
91. See LeRoy, Can TEAM Work?, supra note 89, at 244-51.
92. Id. at 218.
93. See LeRoy, Empirical Research Implications, supra note 89, at 74-78.
94. IL at 42.
95. Id. at 41.
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as the scheduling of work."96 The potentially constraining legal impact on
employers is reduced in his opinion, however, by the fact that the degree
of noncompliance with section 2(5) is typically modest and employers
could bring these teams into compliance fairly easily by narowing the
range of their discussion. Based on these considerations, LeRoy again
comes down largely in support of the third critical position above ("much
ado about nothing"), stating: "Nothing in these findings supports some
employers' claims that the NLRB's current enforcement of section
8(a)(2) is so draconian that nonunion teams must be disbanded to comply
with the law."' Somewhat paradoxically, however, he also concludes that
the passage of the TEAM Act is desirable, because it will not open the
door for the return of old-style company unions but will better protect
legitimate communication and collaboration activities between managers
and employees.
LeRoy's study, however, suffers from three methodological short-
comings that compromise the accuracy and generalizability of its results.
The first problem is that the data were collected by a mail survey, which
is apt to miss important qualitative evidence on the structure and opera-
tion of EIP programs that may be crucial to determining their legal
status.98 The second is that the sample size is quite small, because the
teams come from only six companies in each survey. 9 The third short-
coming is that LeRoy fails to differentiate adequately between "teams"
and other structures used for EIP purposes. Although his survey instru-
ment asked respondents to distinguish among five kinds of employee
groups (employee involvement program, work team, quality-of-work life
program, employee committee, and other),1°° he proceeds to lump all of
these structures under the label "teams" and nowhere provides either a
break-down of these "teams" by the five categories just described or a
discussion of how the "teams" in each category vary by compliance
status. This issue is important, because employee "teams," as that term is
most often used in industry, are smaller in size, more informal in struc-
ture, less likely to perform a representational role, and more likely to be
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 70.
99. See id. at 71.
100. See LeRoy, Can TEAM Work?, supra note 89, at 263. In a forthcoming study, LeRoy
responds to this criticism by separating respondents' survey returns into the five aforemen-
tioned employee groups. Somewhat surprisingly, he finds that small-scale teams appear to have
greater potential compliance problems with section 8(a)(2) than do larger EIP groups, largely
because the teams more often deal with work scheduling. None of the large EIP groups covered
pay issues, but 14% of teams did, another somewhat surprising result. See Michael H. LeRoy,
Do Employee Participation Groups Violate Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act?: An Empirical Analysis, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11.
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focused on production issues than most other forms of EIP.'0  Thus, un-
due focus on employee teams may quite possibly explain why LeRoy
found little evidence of more formal company union-like structures. Fur-
thermore, there are a number of alternative, non-team forms of EIP that
LeRoy does not inquire about, such as peer-review panels, plant-wide
joint industrial councils, and employee representation on the board of di-
rectors.02
A synthesis of LeRoy's work and the other studies and surveys de-
scribed above suggests three generalizations. First, EIP programs are
relatively widespread among medium-large employers and are prolifer-
ating over time. Second, whether due to legal constraints imposed by the
NLRA or the voluntary decisions of employers made in the pursuit of
greater profit, the majority of companies with EIP programs use forms of
employee involvement, such as self-managed work teams, quality circles,
and town hall meetings, that are not directly affected by section 8(a)(2).
Third, the number of companies that use some form of employee repre-
sentation committee as part of their EIP program is nonetheless sizable.
If we assume for illustrative purposes that 15% to 35% of nonunion
workers are employed in companies with some form of representational
committee (other than a safety committee),0 3 the total number of private
sector nonunion wage and salary workers covered by these representa-
tional EIP structures is in the range of 13.2 to 30.9 million.'O Even though
a significant share of these employees are not covered by the NLRA (for
example, public sector workers, managers and supervisors, and transpor-
tation employees), there remain many millions of nonunion workers who
are potentially impacted by the restrictions of the Act on company un-
ions. Moreover, the number of companies that would establish some
form of representational committee were the ban on company unions to
be dropped is unknowable but potentially large. The fact that very few
section 8(a)(2) cases come before the NLRB, therefore, is likely to un-
101. Jon R. Katzenbach and Douglas K. Smith define a team as, "a small number of people
with complementary skills who are committed to a common purpose, performance goals, and
approach for which they hold themselves mutually accountable," and explain that "[v]irtually
all the teams we have met, read, heard about, or been members of have ranged between two
and twenty-five people. The majority of them.., have numbered less than ten." JON R.
KATZENBACH & DOUGLAS K. SMITH, THE WISDOM OF TEAMS: CREATING THE HIGH-
PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATION 45 (1993).
102. See Estreicher, "Company Union" Prohibition, supra note 50, at 137-39 (distinguishing
between "on-line" and "off-line" EIP programs). Leroy focused on teams that largely fall into
the "on-line" category.
103. The lower bound of 15% is suggested by the study of Industrial Relations Counselors,
Inc., supra note 85; the upper bound is suggested by FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 86.
104. Private sector nonunion wage and salary employment for 1998 is calculated from data
reported in UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS,
Jan. 1999, at 221 tbl.42.
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derstate substantially the universe of employers constrained by this pro-
vision of the labor law.
All of these conclusions, however, are necessarily broad-brush and
subject to considerable uncertainty, given the diverse nature and purpose
of the surveys available, the different definitions of EIP utilized in the
studies, and the various types of employee groups included and excluded
from the analyses. Informed policy analysis on section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA and the consequences of Electromation urgently needs, therefore,
additional data on the nature of EIP programs in American industry and
the impact of the NLRA on them. Toward this end, I next present new
field-level data on the use of employee representation committees in EIP
programs in select nonunion companies and then conduct a legal analysis
of the extent to which these employee representation committees violate
the prohibition on company unions contained in the NLRA.
IV. THE STRUCTURE AND LEGAL STATUS OF NONUNION EIP
COMM1TTEES
An analysis of nonunion EIP practices and their compliance with the
NLRA requires a careful definition of EIP, delineation of different types
of EiP groups and organizational structures, and knowledge of the legal
prohibitions contained in the Act. This Part is devoted to all three of
these matters. I begin by developing a conceptual anatomy of EIP pro-
grams in order to delineate alternative forms and methods of employee
involvement.
A. Conceptual Anatomy of EIP Programs
John Cotton, drawing on earlier work by H. Peter Dachler and Bern-
hard Wilpert, suggests that EIP programs can be distinguished along five
distinct dimensions. 5 Modestly paraphrased, these are:
Formal-Informal. Some EIP programs are formal in the sense of
having a written constitution, bylaws, or governing rules and regulations
(such as those contained in an employee handbook or a company policy
statement). Other EIP programs are informal with no written policy
guidelines or defined structure. An example of the former might be a
peer-review system of dispute resolution. An example of the latter might
be a weekly breakfast meeting between the human resource director and
a rotating group of employees.
105. See COITON, supra note 2, at 27-29 (citing H. Peter Dachler & Bernhard Wilpert,
Conceptual Dimensions and Boundaries of Participation in Organizations: A Critical Evaluation,
23 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 1 (1978)).
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Direct-Indirect. Some EIP programs provide direct or "face-to-face"
involvement for organizational members; others are indirect in that a
subgroup of employees represents the entire workforce through partici-
pation in some type of committee or team. An example of the former is a
system of management by objectives in which the individual employee
and manager jointly determine the employee's goals for the coming year.
An example of the latter is a plant-level committee composed of one em-
ployee representative from each department.
Influence in Decisionmaking. A key attribute of EIP is the extent of
influence given employees in decisionmaking. At one extreme, manage-
ment provides no information to employees and makes all decisions be-
yond narrow task completion. In the middle range, management provides
employees with information on a subject hitherto reserved for manage-
ment, and solicits their opinion. At the other extreme, employees may be
given veto power over a decision and may in some cases even be dele-
gated complete authority to choose. An example of the former extreme is
a unilaterally announced change in work hours; an example of the latter
extreme is the complete delegation of inventory control to a self-
managed work team.
Range of Issues. The range of issues considered in EIP programs can
be distinguished by both breadth and depth. Breadth signifies the extent
to which issues from different functional areas are considered, with pro-
duction-related matters representing "narrow" EIP. Thus, a narrow EIP
program might deal only with product quality, such as in a quality circle,
while a "broad" EIP program might deal with not only production mat-
ters but also a wide array of other subjects, such as customer relations,
management succession, and employment policy. An example of a broad
EIP program might be a European-style works council. Range of issues
also has a depth (or high-low) dimension, where depth signifies the level
of impact in the organization. Thus, low-level EIP might pertain to issues
affecting only the individual worker or work team, while high-level EIP
programs affect strategic matters that influence the long-term direction of
the organization. A German co-determination plan in which worker rep-
resentatives serve on the board of directors would be an example of a
high-level EIP program.
Membership. The fifth dimension of EIP is membership-which per-
sons from the organization are included in the EIP group. This dimension
also has axes for breadth and depth. Greater breadth signifies that the
EIP group draws persons from a wider range of work units, occupations,
or departments; greater depth signifies that the EIP group includes peo-
ple from a successively wider range of positions in terms of organiza-
tional hierarchy and authority. A six-person team of production workers
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employed in one area of the trim department is "low" in terms of both
the breadth and depth measures of membership, while a plant-wide
council composed of shopfloor workers and the plant manager is "high"
on both measures.
B. Restrictions in the NLRA
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of a labor organization or support it financially or otherwise.1" Section
2(5) defines a labor organization very broadly as any organization,
agency, or employee representation committee in which employees par-
ticipate and that exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rate of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.'0
The impact of the NLRA on EIP programs depends on the interpre-
tation and application of these two sections of the law. This subject is
complex, given the six decades of litigation and NLRB and court rulings
on the subject,08 the diversity of interpretations offered by the Board and
the federal courts,1' 9 and the huge amount of commentary and analysis in
the labor law literature. 0 The key points, however, are these:
*The analysis of Electromation-type cases proceeds in two steps. The
first is to determine whether the EIP program falls within the section 2(5)
definition of a labor organization. If so, then the analysis considers
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
108. See generally Sandra Nunn, Comment, Are American Employers Operating Within the
Law? The Legality of Employee Action Committees and Other Participation Plans, 63 U.
CINCINNATI L. REv. 1379 (1995) (summarizing court and NLRB decisions involving the impact
of the NLRA on EIP programs).
109. See id. at 1400-02.
110. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Co-
operation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 753 (1994) (providing
an in-depth historical review of the origins of company unions and the reasons for enactment of
the section 8(a)(2) ban); Estreicher, "Company Union" Prohibition, supra note 50 (arguing that
section 8(a)(2) is too restrictive with respect to employee involvement programs and should be
revised); Rafael Gely, Where are We Now?: Life After Electromation, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 45 (1997) (reviewing NLRB section 8(a)(2) decisions since the Electromation case);
William B. Gould IV, Employee Participation and Labor Policy: Why the TEAM Act Should Be
Defeated and the National Labor Relations Act Amended, CREIGHTON L. REV. 3 (1996)
(arguing that the TEAM Act is defective because it will permit employer domination of EIP
committees and that the NLRA should be revised to permit wider employee choice on alterna-
tive forms of representation); Charles J. Morris, A Dialogue with the Chairman of the Labor
Board: Challenging Conventional Wisdom on the Impact of Current Law on Alternative Forms
of Employee Representation, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMp. L.J. 319 (1998) (arguing that the cur-
rent law does not restrict legitimate employee involvement committees).
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whether the program violates the section 8(a)(2) strictures regarding em-
ployer "domination." '
*In Electromation, the NLRB applied a three-part test to determine
whether the EIP committee was indeed a labor organization as defined in
section 2(5). The three elements of the test are: (a) that the organization
is one in which employees participate, (b) that it exists, at least in part,
for purposes of "dealing with" the employer, and (c) that these dealings
involve the prohibited subject areas of "grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, or working hours.
112
*Any EIP committee or group that is representational in nature
clearly meets the criteria of "employees participate in." Whether a com-
mittee or group that is nonrepresentational (i.e., a committee of the
whole) is also illegal has not yet been the subject of a definitive ruling,
but some form of agency function seems to be crucial in drawing the
line.113
*An EIP committee need not be formally constituted to be consid-
ered a labor organization. The Board stated in Electromation that "[a]ny
group, including an employee representation committee, may meet the
statutory definition of 'labor organization' even it lacks a formal struc-
ture, has no elected officers, constitution or bylaws, does not meet regu-
larly, and does not require the payment of initiation fees or dues.
11 4
sEIP groups are illegal if they "deal with" the employer with respect
to certain prohibited subjects. The phrase "deal with" has been inter-
preted broadly to cover not only bargaining and negotiation between
employees and management but also a wide variety of bilateral interac-
tions. The Board stated that it viewed
"dealing with" as a bilateral mechanism involving proposals from the em-
ployee committee concerning the subjects listed in Sec. 2(5), coupled with
real or apparent consideration of these proposals by management. A unilat-
eral mechanism, such as a "suggestion box," or "brainstorming" groups or
meetin s, or analogous information exchanges does not constitute "dealing
with."
I
Thus, in the earlier Thompson Ramo Woolridge case,116 the Board found
that an EIP committee that made presentations to management of em-
ployees' views but no recommendations fell within the meaning of
"dealing with," but in Spark's Nuggett the Board found that an employee
111. See Devaney, supra note 74, at 6.
112. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994.
113. See Ann G. Leibowitz et al., Non-Representative Employee Groups: Fostering Em-
ployee Participation in Workplace Decision-Making, CORNELLJ.L. & PuB. POL'Y 33 (1994).
114. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 995 n.21.
116. Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 993 (1961).
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group established for purposes of resolving grievances did not transgress
the "dealing with" concept since this was a delegation of management
authority rather than a bilateral interaction."7
*EIP committees may lawfully discuss matters related to production,
quality, company business decisions, customer relations, and so on. Any
issue, on the other hand, related broadly to terms and conditions of em-
ployment, such as work scheduling, safety, or grievances, is illegal."" In
practice, a rule of reason has been applied, which exempts EIP commit-
tees that discuss these matters from the strictures of section 2(5) where it
is clear that the illegal activity was inadvertent and very infrequently
done."9
*Once these issues are settled, and assuming the EIP group falls
within the definition of a labor organization, the analysis then proceeds
to the second step-whether section 8(a)(2) has been violated. The basic
issue here is whether the employer "dominates," "interferes with," or
"supports" a labor organization. In Electromation, the Board stated:
[W]hen the impetus behind the formation of an organization of employees
emanates from an employer and the organization has no effective existence
independent of the employer's active involvement, a finding of domination is
appropriate if the purpose of the orgaization is to deal with the employer
concerning conditions of employment.
Following this logic, both the Board and the courts have in the past found
evidence of domination, interference, and support when an employer fi-
nancially or has otherwise assisted in the process of selecting employee
representatives, drew up a charter for the group, provided any kind of
ongoing financial support, provided meeting rooms, or paid employees
for missed work time at council meetings. Although several federal cir-
cuit courts have attempted to relax the definition of "domination" by
taking into account the employer's motive in setting up the EIP pro-
gram-by considering whether it was for the purpose of better communi-
cation and increased productivity or for union avoidance-the NLRB has
so far ruled that section 8(a)(2) constitutes a per se ban and thus em-
ployer motive is irrelevant.12'
117. Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977).
118. See Nunn, supra note 108, at 1398-1415.
119. See, e.g., Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995). Evidence in Vons Grocery indi-
cated that at one meeting of a company-created employee quality circle the discussion strayed
from production and quality issues to accidents and the dress code. Although the quality circle
was technically in violation of section 2(5), the NLRB viewed this as a de minimus violation and
abjured from finding the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice. See id. at 54.
120. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 996.
121. See Nunn, supra note 108, at 1423.
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C. Which Types of EIP Programs Pass the Test?
We now come to the crucial question: Which types of EIP programs
are legal under the NLRA and which types are not? I use two methods to
find the likely answer.
The first is to return to the five dimensions of EIP programs previ-
ously discussed and examine whether any of them are determinative of
legality.
Formal-InformaL The formal-informal dimension is not determina-
tive on the issue of legality. Either type may be legal or illegal, depending
on other criteria."'
Direct-Indirect. Subject to having violated at least one other prohib-
ited criterion (such as the discussion of wages), an EIP program that pro-
vides some form of indirect representational or agency function will be
ruled illegal. A group that provides "direct" participation, such as a
committee of the whole or a production team, will typically not be found
to violate the law, however.'2'
Influence in Decisionmaking. The amount of influence or power exer-
cised by the EIP group is not determinative of its legal status. Instead, the
crucial issue is the structure of its authority and the manner of interaction
with management. As long as the authority to make decisions is clearly
delegated to employees and they utilize it in an independent manner to
reach decisions, like deciding grievance appeals, the EIP group is legal.
Influence, no matter how small, exercised by an EIP group via bilateral
interaction with management, such as discussing employee concerns, is
likely to be ruled illegal. 24
Range of Issues. EIP groups that discuss any topic related to terms
and conditions of employment are illegal.'25 Literally interpreted, this in-
cludes such issues as safety, work schedules, gain sharing, sexual harass-
ment, and workplace violence.
Range of Membership. The membership composition of an EIP group
is also not a determinative factor in determining its legality or illegality,
so long as the group includes at least some employees below the rank of
first-level management. The committee may be limited solely to non-
managerial employees or may be jointly constituted with representatives
from both employees and management. Likewise, the representatives
122. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
124. See supra text accompanying note 115.
125. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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may be elected or selected in some other way, such as on a rotating ba-
sis.
126
The crucial factors thus appear to be whether the group is representa-
tional in nature and whether the group deals in a bilateral manner with
the company management. These criteria should distinguish between the
legal and illegal nature of various types of EIP programs commonly
found in American workplaces. Consider, for example, the following:
Self-directed work teams. These are legal, since the participation is
typically "direct" rather than representational in nature1,
Quality Circles. These are also legal, since the issues considered typi-
cally relate exclusively to production9
Safety Committees. Although thirteen states have passed legislation
mandating that companies establish some form of joint employee-
management safety committee,'2 9 these committees nonetheless are often
illegal.3z This conflict has manifested itself in recent proposed legislation,
the Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act, which
includes a provision specifically exempting safety committees from the
strictures of the NLRA.'3 1
Grievance Committees. These groups typically contain several man-
agement and employee members who hear disputes and render decisions
on matters of discipline and discharge. If the grievance committee is
delegated final authority to make decisions, it will pass the legality test. If
its decisions are in some sense recommendations to management or are
reached only conditional on management approval, however, it runs the
risk of being found to be illegal. 32
126. See Ampex Corp., 168 N.L.R.B. 742,746-47 (1967).
127. See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1233-34 (1977).
128. See Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53,53 (1995).
129. See Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 295 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Congress (1997) (statement of J. Thomas
Bouchard, Sr. Vice President, Human Resources, IBM Corporation); see also Gregory Watch-
man, Safe and Sound: The Case for Safety and Health Committees Under OSHA and the NLRA,
4 CoRNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65 (1994).
130. In EFCO Corp., 327 N.L.R.B. 71, 76 (1998), the Board ruled that the joint safety
committee established by the company was a labor organization as defined by section 2(5) be-
cause the committee engaged in activities that constituted "dealing with" management, such as
reviewing safety rules and policies, developing safety incentive programs, and, most signifi-
cantly, making proposals to management about such policies and programs. In its ruling, the
Board stated that the safety committee would not be a labor organization if it had confined its
activities to things such as encouraging employees to submit safety ideas, reporting safety haz-
ards to management, communicating safety information to employees, or conducting safety
training. Dennis Devaney describes the case of a Tennessee company that was required by state
law to have a joint labor-management safety committee but was then charged by the NLRB
with a section 8(a)(2) violation. See Devaney, supra note 74, at 20.
131. S. 1622,102d Cong. (1991).
132. See Nunn, supra note 108, at 1407-08.
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Ombudsperson. An ombudsperson is an individual designated by the
employer to serve as a counselor, mediator, and problem solver with re-
spect to workplace disputes. Although an ombudsperson is almost by
definition not a collective entity, the person often serves in an agency ca-
pacity for an employee grievant vis-a-vis the employer. Thus, an ombuds-
plan will be an illegal, "dominated" labor organization if the ombudsper-
son represents an employee in a dispute over terms and conditions of
employment.1 3
Employee Councils. Another form of EIP is an employee committee
or joint employer-employee council, formed either on a department- or
plant-wide basis, that meets with management regularly to discuss mat-
ters of mutual interest. It is legal only so long as it avoids issues concern-
ing terms and conditions of employment9
Focus or "Brainstorming" Groups. Some companies ask selected em-
ployees to meet with management as a focus or "brainstorming" group
for purposes of eliciting suggestions and comments on some change in
company policy or opinions on topics of concern to employees. These
groups are legal as long as they are ad hoc, temporary, and for purposes
of communication.
135
Scanlon Plans. A Scanlon Plan is a form of gain-sharing compensa-
tion system in which employees submit cost-saving suggestions to a joint
employee-employer committee. The committee decides which ideas have
merit and should be implemented. Employees then share in some portion
of the savings. These committees appear to be illegal, at least if outside a
collective bargaining relationship, since they are representational, "deal
with" the employer, and handle an issue-pay-related to the terms and
conditions of employment.136
Employee Representatives on the Board of Directors. One or more
employees are sometimes chosen either by management or fellow em-
ployees to serve as members, either voting or nonvoting, on the com-
pany's board of directors. This arrangement is legal only if the employee
representatives either take part exclusively in the deliberations and deci-
sionmaking on issues unrelated to terms and conditions of employment
or participate only to the extent of communicating employee views,
133. See N.L.R.B. v. General Precision, Inc., 381 F.2d 61, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1967).
134. See Webcor Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995). In Webcor Packaging, the em-
ployer established a representative body called the Plant Council. Hourly employees elected
five of their peers to serve as representatives. Its purpose was to assist the employer in devel-
oping company policy related to issues such as grievances, compensation, and revision of the
employee handbook. The NLRB determined the council was in violation of section 8(a)(2). See
id. at 1205.
135. See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1003.
136. See Kent F. Murrmann, The Scanlon Plan Joint Committee and Section 8(a)(2), 31
LAB. L.J. 299 (1980).
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opinions, or other relevant information to the board, when terms and
conditions of employment are on the table. 37
Nonunion Professional Employee Association. Professional employ-
ees such as nurses, engineers, and teachers sometimes form an associa-
tion to promote their employment interests. These interests often include
a mix of professional issues, such as accreditation standards and training
requirements, and issues related to the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, such as salary levels and work scheduling. These associations may
cover only employees in one company or they may represent employees
across several companies or states. They are nonunion in that they have
no formal certification from the NLRB as an agency of collective bar-
gaining. These nonunion employee associations are legal as long as they
are not employer-dominated, which is to say they are independently ini-
tiated by employees and do not rely on employee financial or administra-
tive support for their continued existence.'38
The second method that sheds light on what types of EIP programs
are legal under the NLRA is to examine guidelines given to companies
on this matter by their legal counsel. Former Board member Dennis De-
vaney, co-author of the Electromation decision, cites the following exam-
ple with apparent approval:
[I]n order to remain within the legal ambit of section 8(a)(2), such plans
should:
1) avoid structured groups in favor of ongoing employee involvement on an
individual or unstructured group basis;
2) establish task-specific ad hoc groups that focus on a particular communica-
tions, efficiency, or productivity issue (as opposed to wages, hours...) on a
short term basis and then go out of existence;
3) use irregular groupings of employees, such as occur during retreats and the
like, to address communications, efficiency, or productivity issues; and
4) use staff meetings to address communications, efficiency and productivity
issues. Such meetings should be attended by all staff, rather than a represen-
tative number, in order to avoid the problem of employees representing
other employees. 1
39
137. See Research Federal Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B. 56, 56 n.1 (1993). In this case, the
employer created an employee representation committee that met with management to develop
policy issues on employment-related matters, and the committee then presented the recom-
mendations to the Board of Directors. See id at 61-63. The NLRB ruled that the committee was
a dominated labor organization. See id. at 65-66.
138. See, e.g., Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 312 N.L.R.B. 582,587 (1993).
139. Devaney, supra note 74, at 23.
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V. EIP PROGRAMS INNONuNION COMPANIES: SIX CASE STUDIES
In this Part I shall present six brief case-studies of EIP programs cur-
rently in operation at six American companies. These companies, as indi-
cated below, come from a variety of lines of business, are located in three
different states, and range in size from approximately 300 employees to
more than 100,000. They were selected largely because (a) the unit
(plant, division, company) is mostly or completely nonunion (b) the plant
or company has a well-developed EIP program or is moving in that direc-
tion, (c) the companies represent different industries, and (d) the senior
management was willing to be interviewed and to allow me to publish a
summary of what I found. I also interviewed high-level managers from
three other companies with well-established EIP programs, but they re-
quested that this Article not feature their companies.
In selecting the companies for this study, I relied largely on the advice
of management consultants and attorneys about which companies in the
southeastern United States have advanced EIP programs. No effort was
made to pre-screen the companies in order to find a particular type of
EIP structure or activity, and no companies were subsequently excluded
from this Article for any substantive purpose. The companies reviewed
their case studies for factual accuracy.
I noted in Part III of this Article that LeRoy's two studies provide the
only other recent evidence obtained directly from nonunion companies
on the representational structure and function of EiP teams and the
NLRA's constraints thereon. The empirical evidence reported here also
suffers from one of the methodological flaws found in LeRoy's studies-
small sample size-but is largely free of the other two-reliance on a mail
survey and narrow focus on teams. This study, like LeRoy's, is based on
evidence collected from only six companies.' 4° Thus, extreme caution
must be exercised in making generalizations from the patterns and char-
acteristics of EIP programs reported here. At the same time, however, it
is worth noting that these six case studies provide the first in-depth de-
scription in the academic literature of the full range of EIP structures
utilized in a sample of nonunion companies as well as the use of em-
ployee representational committees therein.
Instead of being collected through a posted survey questionnaire, the
data collected for this study were in each case obtained from an in-depth
personal interview with a high-level company executive. This method is
likely to gather more accurate and complete information, partly because
a personal interview can elicit qualitative information or explore complex
140. This sample size excludes the three additional companies that requested that I not dis-
close their information in this Article.
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subjects in ways that a mail survey cannot and partly because the individ-
ual interviewed is more likely to be forthcoming and truthful in a per-
sonal interview than in a mail survey returned to a person he or she does
not know.'41 I also broadened the scope of investigation beyond "teams,"
which tend to be small-scale employee groups focused largely on produc-
tion and quality issues, to include all facets of employee involvement.
The result is likely to be a more accurate assessment of the extent to
which employee representation committees are used in American indus-




Line of Business: Manufacturing Soaps and Detergents.
Employment: 270.
Structure of EIP:
Self-managed work teams. The plant runs on two twelve-hour shifts,
and each shift has two production teams, one in the process
(manufacturing) area and the other in the packaging area. Duties of su-
pervisors covering five functional areas have been delegated to the pro-
duction teams: safety, production, training, administration, and counsel-
ing. Various team members (called "technicians") assume responsibility
for managing each of these functions as a "second hat." This requires ex-
tensive, ongoing, and cross-functional training, that is roughly estimated
to be between five and ten times the amount of training provided in a
traditional plant. The most important of these areas is production coor-
dinator, and this job is elevated to a full-time position. Team members
select the production coordinator on an annual basis. Teams are respon-
sible for all aspects of day-to-day operation, including ordering supplies,
planning production runs, monitoring quality, machine repair, and coun-
seling peers on performance or behavior problems. They also interview
new job candidates. When additional technical or management expertise
is needed, teams call on "resources" from a cadre of nine people in a
"leadership group," such as the plant manager (who splits his time be-
tween this plant and another one in a different state), the human re-
141. Anonymity for the companies interviewed was essential, given their fears of possible
adverse legal action upon publication of these case studies. The Donnelly Corporation testified
before the Dunlop Commission about its nonunion employer committees and was subsequently
charged with a section 8(a)(2) violation. See John Merline, Halting Worker-Manager Teams,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Feb. 2, 1996, at Al. It is quite possible that, with these fears in mind,
the executives I interviewed may have selectively failed to reveal the complete breadth and
depth of their EIP activities-in any event, this problem that would most likely have been exac-
erbated had I used a mail survey.
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source director, and the controller. The least integrated and self-managed
of the groups is the twenty-person administrative support group, which is
composed of clerical and administrative staff.
Packaging and Process Work Groups. The next level of EIP is the
Packaging Work Group and Process Work Group. Each group meets
once a week and has twelve technicians and leaders. The groups' mis-
sions are, in large part, to review operating results; address problems or
needs in production, quality, and training; perform medium-to-long-
range planning for their area; appoint special task forces to work on some
specified issues or problems (for example, shift rotation or the late deliv-
ery of supplies), and so on. Technicians rotate on and off each group as
part of the way they fulfill the "leadership" block in the pay-for-
knowledge compensation system. All technicians thus have an incentive
and intention to develop leadership and management skills.
Plant Review Board. Problems or disputes related to job perform-
ance, interpersonal relations, work assignment, and related issues are first
dealt with at the team level by the employee and one of the several coun-
selors. If not resolved at this level, the HR director is called in as a
"resource," and, as a final step, the grievant can ask that the dispute be
presented to a body known as the Plant Review Board, a peer-review
group composed of both technicians and leaders. The Board can only
make a recommendation; the plant manager makes the final determina-
tion. No employee can be discharged without the Plant Review Board
first examining the case.
Special Project Teams/Committees. Ad hoc committees and teams of
technicians and leaders are formed on an "as needed" basis to address a
particular problem or issue. They develop recommendations that are
forwarded on to the leadership group that makes the decision. The com-
pany would prefer to have greater joint decisionmaking at this step but
has erected a "wall" in the process to avoid a potential charge of "dealing
with" employees.
Compensation. The plant has a pay-for-knowledge system and an all-
salaried workforce. The plant recently introduced a form of gain-sharing
for all employees. Pay rates are pegged at the 95th percentile in the local
labor market in order to attract and retain the best of the local labor sup-
ply.
Information. Extensive information on all aspects of production,
quality, cost, and on-time-deliveries are provided to the technicians.
"Nothing is hidden." Formal employee surveys are conducted, but this is
relatively infrequent and largely in response to a perceived "need to
know."
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Company B
Unit: Individual Plant.
Line of Business: Automobile Assembly.
Employment: 2400.
Structure of EIP:
Work Zone Teams. The plant is organized into "work zones," and
each work zone typically has a "team" of between ten and twenty em-
ployees. An "area manager" oversees each team in a supervisory capac-
ity. The teams meet at the start of each shift to review production issues
and determine job rotation. They are also responsible for quality inspec-
tion and repairs in their work zone. They do not interview job candidates
or participate in peer counseling.
IMPACT Groups. These evolved out of quality circles, which proved
to be ineffective. An employee may make a request to the area manager
that an IMPACT group be formed to solve a problem or address an issue
(for example, the need to redesign a work process to reduce heavy lift-
ing). The manager forms a team of people with the relevant skills and
knowledge that develops a proposed solution. The area manager has the
discretion to approve or disapprove the proposed solution, but usually
approval is given (sometimes subject to modification).
Safety Committees. These are joint employee-management commit-
tees that meet periodically, investigate reports of unsafe conditions,
sponsor training sessions, and consider new safety practices and policies.
The safety committees are the most formal type of employee representa-
tion in the plant. They necessarily deal with subjects related to terms and
conditions of employment, such as job rotation, work hours, and line
speed.
Peer-Review Panel. This is the most "empowered" committee in
which employees participate. Employees who have reached the last step
of the dispute-resolution process or who have been terminated for cer-
tain offenses can request a hearing before a peer-review panel. The panel
is composed of five people, two from management and three from em-
ployees who have received additional training in dispute resolution. The
panel's decision is binding and results in reversal of a disciplinary deci-
sion in about twenty percent of the cases-a number that is relatively
low, it is said, because the process is so carefully managed before cases
get to this point.
Focus Groups. Management regularly convenes focus groups of em-
ployees to solicit opinions and suggestions (for example, proposed
changes in vacation scheduling). Thirty to forty employees are selected
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from across the plant on a one-time basis and meet for approximately
one hour.
Breakfast and Lunch Meetings. The plant's vice president of human
resources and other executives schedule regular breakfast and lunch
meetings with employees for purposes of informal discussion and "taking
the pulse."
Success Sharing Compensation. Part of the compensation system is a
"success sharing" bonus that pays employees based on plant-level per-
formance on several business plan objectives (for example, defect rates).
Information Sharing. Periodic employee surveys are administered.
Video monitors are stationed in each work zone and are used for com-
municating with employees about new policies and upcoming events.
Weekly bulletins and monthly newsletters are also distributed.
Company C
Unit: Company.
Line of Business: Airline transportation.
Employment: 68,000.
Structure of EIP:
Continuous Improvement Teams. Approximately 3500 employees
from across the company are organized into 300 continuous improvement
teams ("CITs"). The teams are initiated by the management or employ-
ees of an individual work unit (for example, a group of mechanics at a
repair facility), usually include six to ten people, and focus on work proc-
ess improvements. Team members volunteer and rotate on and off on an
informal basis.
Personnel Meetings. Once every one to two years employees in each
work unit participate in a "personnel meeting." The divisional vice presi-
dent or other officer of similar rank leads the meeting, accompanied by a
representative of the personnel department. It is essentially a "town hall"
event in which the executive first provides an overview of recent business
developments, performance issues in the division or work unit, and other
information, and then solicits questions and discussion from the audience
on all relevant issues. Suggestions and complaints are recorded for later
management review and action.
InFlight Forum. One of the divisions of the company is "Inflight
Service." It has 18,000 employees, most of whom are flight attendants.
The Senior Vice President in charge of the division organized an em-
ployee representational group called the "Inflight Forum" composed of
one representative from each of the company's twenty-six bases. Each
representative is elected. The Forum, which meets three to four times a
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year at the company's headquarters, promotes improved communication
and exchange of ideas between employees and senior management. Each
base has its own "mini-forum" of elected employee representatives
meeting with base management. Issues are solicited from all of the bases,
and the two that are both system-wide in nature and of highest priority
are put on the agenda of the InFlight Forum. Any subject can be dis-
cussed, but guidelines established by management stipulate that certain
things are "off the table"-mainly subjects that are of a company-wide
nature, such as the number of vacation days. In addition to promoting
dialogue, the Forum can form teams to investigate a particular topic,
benchmark competitors' practices, and then develop a proposal to be
presented to senior management. Management may accept or reject the
proposal or suggest the need for modifications or further deliberation by
the InFlight Forum.
Personnel Board Council. Approximately two years ago a company-
wide body called the Personnel Board Council ("PBC") was established.
In the last contract negotiations the company's pilots, who are unionized,
successfully negotiated to get one nonvoting seat on the company's board
of directors. The company decided also to provide the nonrepresented
employees with nonvoting board seats. Toward that end, the PBC com-
prises one person from each of seven divisions. One division covers man-
agement employees up to the senior executive level. The purpose of the
PBC, as stated in a written charter, is to provide a two-way communica-
tion channel between the board of directors and the employees. The em-
ployees in each division establish the procedure for choosing their repre-
sentative to the PBC. None is elected. Rather, the representatives are
chosen through a process of nomination and personal interviews con-
ducted by employee peers. The PBC members serve for two-year terms.
They solicit opinions, ideas, and complaints from fellow division employ-
ees and also travel as a group to various company facilities to conduct fo-
cus groups and personal interviews with employees. They then decide
among themselves which is the most important company-wide issue and
are given fifteen minutes at the next board of director's meeting to dis-
cuss it and present recommendations and proposals. Senior management
does not participate in choosing the topics to be presented to the board
or in developing the proposals, other than to provide information or re-
sources if requested. A summary of the topics presented at the board
meeting and the discussion thereof is distributed to employees through
several methods, such as newsletters and an intranet system.
Profit-sharing. The company recently established a profit-sharing
program for all employees. No other form of gain-sharing or incentive
pay is provided.
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Information-sharing. Periodic employee surveys are conducted. The
results of the most recent one were made available to all employees. A
once-a-month "phone-in" is held in which employees anywhere in the
world can call in and ask a question of a designated senior executive.
Company D
Unit: Mill.
Line of Business: Paper Manufacture.
Employment: 700.
Structure of EIP:
Production Teams. Production employees are organized into teams
built around distinct work processes, such as the operation of a paper
machine. The teams are responsible for the day-to-day management of
operations and administrative tasks. Team members rotate jobs, so there
is extensive cross-functional training. Each employee has a matrix of re-
quired and elective "skill blocks" to complete as part of the skill-based
pay system. Successful completion of each skill block is determined by a
panel of employee peers.
Dispute Resolution. The first step in dispute resolution is counseling
with peer team members. If the problem is not satisfactorily resolved, the
grievant can ask that a peer-review panel be established. The panel's
charge is to develop two to three possible courses of action, state as a
recommendation which one the panel favors, and turn these over to the
plant manager, who makes the decision. A discharged employee can also
request arbitration if the person's team members disagree with the deci-
sion.
Department and Mill Core Teams. Every department has a "core
team" composed of employee representatives and department manage-
ment representatives that meets periodically to discuss department-level
issues. These are generally related to production, quality, on-time deliv-
ery, and other such matters, but employment issues such as relief time
and safety come up. There is also a "mill core team," composed of ten
employees and six "leaders" (management) that meets regularly to dis-
cuss mill-wide issues. Both department and mill core teams have written
charters. These charters explicitly state that the teams are not to consider
personnel issues such as wages, vacations or hours. The person inter-
viewed felt this requirement "chilled" the effectiveness of the EIP proc-
ess. The mill core team meetings tend to be bland and the mill manager
usually does not attend since employees tend to defer instinctively to his
authority. The employee representatives on the mill core team select the
employees to serve on the department core teams, thus making depart-
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ment core teams a "feeder" channel for the mill core team. Service on
these teams is required for successful completion of certain skill blocks.
Listening Groups and Project Teams. Once a year the mill's human
resource director forms a "listening group" of employees and solicits
their opinion on a set of issues. The mill also puts employees on special
project teams to investigate specific issues and make recommendations.
Each year, for example, several employees and the human resource di-
rector serve on a compensation committee that surveys pay rates at other
mills. The human resources director then develops recommendations for
senior mill management.
Employee Surveys. Employee surveys are done every two years.
Company E
Unit: State-level unit of the service division of a 110,000 employee
company.
Line of Business: Service and repair of photocopiers.
Employees: 450.
Structure of EIP:
Self-Managed Work Teams. The employees in this unit of the com-
pany are primarily service technicians who repair and service the com-
pany's brand of photocopiers. Until the late 1980s, each manager would
be assigned to coordinate and monitor approximately twelve technicians.
It was the manager's job to act as a clearinghouse for customer calls, as-
sign calls to individual technicians, take customer complaints, and moni-
tor the work and performance of each technician. Technicians provided
the manager with daily and weekly reports of their activities, the types of
repairs done at each site, and the cost of parts used. The traditional or-
ganizational structure and underlying work processes were revamped in
the late 1980s as part of a company-wide total quality management
("TQM") program. Technicians were formed into work groups of six to
seven members, and each group was made responsible for many of the
tasks formerly done by the manager. Thus, each work group is empow-
ered to decide how calls will be handled, who will be assigned to each
call, and how the work is to be done. Managers now have a span of con-
trol of thirty-to-one (approximately five work groups).
Information. Part of what allowed the large increase in span of con-
trol is new technology. Each technician has a laptop computer and, rather
than give the manager a written report, transmits the data to corporate
headquarters, where it can be immediately accessed by all work group
members, the manager, and work groups in other states. Technicians also
have electronic access to extensive data on all aspects of the company's
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business performance. Intra-team coordination has been facilitated by
giving each technician a portable telephone so that they are in continual
communication with each other and can hold field-level group brain-
storming sessions.
Compensation. Individual performance evaluation now has a large
component related to performance of the work group. A gain-sharing
program also makes a part of individual pay depend on the team's per-




Line of Business: Manufacturing missiles.
Employment: 1000.
Structure of El:
Self-Managed Work Teams. This plant converted to self-managed
work teams over a twelve-month period in the late 1980s as part of a
comprehensive transformation to a high-performance, TQM-based work
system. Teams may be as large as twenty people, but memberships of
eight to twelve are preferred. The teams are given monthly and annual
production targets and expense budgets and are responsible for deciding
how these are met. Thus, the teams determine the production schedule,
the assignment of tasks, and extent of job rotation and perform their own
quality inspections. The teams also schedule vacations and can elect to
take a temporary "layoff" if production is slow.
Plant-wide Committees. Three plant-wide joint employee-
management committees are in operation. The first is the "workplace ac-
tion team," which deals with issues such as work schedules and security
(a large concern at this facility). The second is the "environment and
safety team," which deals with occupational safety and health issues. The
third is the "gain-sharing team," which is responsible for managing the
gain-sharing program. Each committee has a "diagonal slice" of employ-
ees, including senior plant management, persons from the engineering
and administrative staffs, and shopfloor employees. The gain-sharing
team is the one that elicits the most employee interest and is viewed as
being the most prestigious. The gain-sharing program provides employ-
ees with a bonus payment based on their ability to reduce production
costs below a target figure. The committee thus monitors expenses
(including management expenses on furniture and travel), periodically
adds, deletes, or modifies performance targets, and issues regular reports
to the plant employees on the status of that period's gain-sharing pool.
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People Council. This plant is one of five in its division. Three councils
have been established that cover all five plants: a production council, a
growth council and a people council ("PC"). The PC deals with all per-
sonnel-related processes and problems, including but not limited to tradi-
tional human-resource issues. Twelve people serve on the PC, drawn
from the five plants and from the ranks of management, the professional
staff (engineering), and production employees. The PC meets once a
week, via teleconferencing, and has a very informal structure and opera-
tion. Its members have no tenure and are selected by management on a
consultative basis with key stakeholders. The PC charters a variety of
project teams that are charged with investigating specific issues. These
teams are also joint employee-management groups. They periodically
update the PC with a progress report and in turn receive "mid-course"
feedback. Eventually they present a report or set of recommendations to
the PC which, through a process of informal consensus-building, decides
either to accept, modify, or send the proposal back for further work. An
accepted proposal is then submitted by the PC to the division's all-
management "executive council," which makes the final decision.
Town-Hall Meeting. Every year all employees attend a town-hall
meeting off-site at which plant management and teams report on various
aspects of plant performance, including profit and loss, followed by an
open question-and-answer period.
Peer Review. A half-dozen channels exist for resolution of workplace
problems, but one option is to bring the matter before a plant-level peer-
review panel.
Employee Survey. A survey of employees is done regularly.
VI. COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS
A. The Six Case Studies
I believe that the breadth and depth of EIP activities undertaken by
these six companies is quite striking. I also perceive, however, a signifi-
cant incongruence between what a strict reading of the labor law says is
permissible and what several of these companies are in fact doing in their
EIP programs.
Most noteworthy in this regard are Company C (airline transporta-
tion) and Company F (missile manufacture). Both companies have em-
ployee representational bodies that are in a number of respects closely
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akin to the 1920s-era employee representation plans.' 42 In the former
case, the InFlight Forum and the Personnel Board Council are division-
wide or company-wide representational bodies that are financed by the
employer. They have written charters, elected or selected employee dele-
gates, regular meetings with management, and agendas that include is-
sues related to the terms and conditions of employment. In the case of
Company F, the People Council spans five plants, has selected employee
representatives that meet with management, and considers various as-
pects of the terms and conditions of employment. It should be noted that
executives at both companies are well aware of the law regarding non-
union employee committees and have consulted labor attorneys on the
matter, but have proceeded with their representation plans in the belief
they conform to the relevant labor law (the Railway Labor Act ("RLA")
in the case of Company C and the NLRA in the case of Company F).4 1 It
can fairly be said that these parts of the EIP programs at these two com-
panies appear to push against the boundary of what is permissible under
the NLRA.
Three of the other companies, Company A (detergent manufacture),
Company B (auto assembly), and Company D (paper manufacture), also
have employee representational bodies that in some respect raise section
8(a)(2) compliance issues, but not to the same degree as Companies C
and F.
In Company A, for example, the Packaging and Work Process groups
are composed of employee representatives and selected managers, focus
predominantly on production and quality issues but also on employment
matters related to scheduling and safety, have authority to deliberate and
make decisions, and are company-financed and controlled. In Company
142. This finding calls into question the assertion of Martin Moe that "the 1930s company
union has little in common in terms of structure, purpose, or effect with most company EIPs."
Martin Moe, Participatory Workplace Decisionmaking and the NLRA: Section 8(a)(2), Electro-
mation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1127, 1134 n.32 (1993).
143. The Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15, 18, 28, 45 U.S.C. (1994)), also prohibits employer domination of a labor organization. It
provides that, "representatives for both management and labor shall be designated by the re-
spective parties and without interference, influence, or coercion by either party over the desig-
nation of representatives of the other," 45 U.S.C. § 152 para. 3 (1994), and that, "It shall be un-
lawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use
the funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization,
labor representative, or other agency for collective bargaining," id. para. 4. The Railway Labor
Act 1 defines a "representative" broadly: "any person or persons, labor union, organization, or
corporation designated either by a carrier or group of carriers or by its or their employees, to
act for it or them." Id. § 151 para. 6. Companies covered by the RLA nonetheless have greater
latitude to operate nonunion employee committees because the National Mediation Board-the
enforcement agency established by the Act-only has authority to disestablish such committees
if they are found to illegitimately interfere with employee free choice once a union has success-
fully petitioned for a representation election. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd.,
158 L.R.R.M. 2984 (D.D.C. 1998).
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B, the joint safety committees appear to be the part of the EIP program
that comes closest to infringing on section 8(a)(2), given that the commit-
tees are composed of employee representatives and selected manage-
ment personnel and are empowered to make joint decisions on safety
matters. In Company D, the department and mill core teams appear to
violate most significantly section 8(a)(2)'s prohibitions, for, even though
the focus of the groups is on production issues, the employee and man-
agement representatives on each team must occasionally consider em-
ployment subjects such as work scheduling, job rotation, and safety in the
course of their deliberations.
The only company of the six considered here that clearly appears to
fall within the boundaries established by Electromation is Company E
(photocopier service). The work groups are composed of all technicians
assigned to that unit and thus are not representational in nature. These
work groups correspond most closely to the small, production-oriented
"teams" that LeRoy focuses on in his two studies1" and that are discussed
in much of the contemporary management literature on high-
performance workplaces.145
Another indication of the gap between actual practice among these
six companies and what is permissible under the NLRA is to compare
their EIP programs with the practices cited by Electromation co-author
Dennis Devaney as legally preferred.1 46 Briefly, these are: avoiding struc-
tured groups in favor of EIP conducted on an individual or unstructured
group level; establishing task-specific ad hoc groups focused on produc-
tivity, efficiency, and communication; using irregular groupings of em-
ployees, such as at retreats; and using staff meetings at which all staff are
present to address communication issues (thus avoiding representational
issues). It is evident that only the EIP program at Company E, the photo-
copier service provider, comes reasonably close to meeting these criteria.
The EIP programs at the other five companies would all have to be modi-
fied-modestly at Companies A, B, and D and substantially at Compa-
nies C and F.
B. Comments of Managers and Attorneys
To gain further insight on the constraining effect of the NLRA on
employee involvement programs in nonunion companies, in each inter-
view at these six companies I asked the management executive a series of
open-ended questions about his or her opinion regarding the impact of
144. See sources cited supra note 89.
145. See, e.g., KATZENBACH & SMITH, supra note 101.
146. See supra text accompanying note 139.
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the law on the company's EIP activities and whether the company would
use more employee representational EIP structures if allowed. These
matters were also explored in interviews with managers at the three other
companies that declined to have their EIP activities featured in this arti-
cle. I also interviewed four labor attorneys on the management side who
are familiar with EIP programs and section 8(a)(2), and two management
consultants who specialize in the design and implementation of high-
performance workplace systems. Their comments and observations are
summarized and synthesized below. Obviously, they are anecdotal, in
some cases speculative, and based on a small number of cases, so caution
is required in generalizing from them.
Responses from managers fell into three types. The first type of re-
sponse was a lack of concern. Several managers, including the represen-
tative of Company E, whose EIP programs were clearly within the law
believed that, while the restrictions imposed by the NLRA might be
counterproductive and out-of-date, this was of little practical concern be-
cause they neither had nor desired to have the more formal systems of
employee representation that might pose a legal problem.
The second response pattern was from managers whose EIP pro-
grams come closer to the legal boundary established by the NLRA but
who have taken pains to ensure that the programs meet not only the
spirit but also the letter of the law, such as those at Company A. Typi-
cally, these managers were more likely to follow the counsel of a man-
agement labor attorney in setting up the EIP program and to structure it
in ways that would pass muster with the NLRB. These managers thus
uniformly saw attorneys as a conservative and restraining influence on
their initiatives in the EIP area.
The commitment of the latter group of managers to a strict "better
safe than sorry" approach to EIP forces them to make certain compro-
mises or changes in their programs that are typically viewed as awkward
or counterproductive. To avoid a charge of "dealing with" employees in a
manner that would violate the NLRA, for example, their companies re-
sort to several stratagems. They may announce, for example, that all em-
ployment-related issues are "off-limits." Doing so, however, is seen by
the managers as counterproductive on two counts: first, because many
aspects of efficiency enhancement and quality improvement inevitably
require detailed and in-depth discussions with workers regarding various
employment issues and, second, because many employees resent EIP
programs devoted only to management's interests in productivity and
quality issues. Paradoxically, say these management executives, section
8(a)(2) actually works against employee interests in this regard, because
it provides nonunion companies with a convenient excuse to avoid deal-
Yale Law & Policy Review
ing with issues that primarily affect the well-being and livelihoods of
workers.
Alternatively, the companies may completely delegate authority to
the employee committees so that there is no bilateral interaction between
management and labor, such as making the decisions of a peer-review
panel final and binding. From a management perspective, this approach
both satisfies the law and increases the credibility and legitimacy of the
decisions made by the employee representational committee, but it also
opens up the possibility that a committee's decisions may substantially
change company employment policy (an "unholy precedent") or contra-
vene employment law.
Finally, to resolve the "dealing with" problem, the companies may
limit the employee committee's role to communication and information
exchange, reserving to management the process of deliberation and final
decision. As an example, one manager said that the employee committee
investigated the feasibility of alternative shift schedules, developed a list
of pros and cons, and then "heaved the information over the wall" to
management, who then made the final decision. This approach report-
edly satisfied neither management nor the employees but was viewed as
the price that had to be paid to stay within the law.
The third response pattern among the management was to be cogni-
zant of sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) but nonetheless to pursue more effective
EIP programs at the risk of crossing the line and doing something that
may be determined to violate the NLRA. Thus, the aim of these compa-
nies is to avoid clear violations but otherwise proceed with their EIP pro-
grams unless told to cease and desist. This attitude is the product of three
convictions: first, that what they are doing produces a win-win outcome
for the company and employees; second, that the restrictions imposed by
sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) are out-of-date and counterproductive; and,
third, that the penalties in the NLRA for violating section 8(a)(2) are
quite small, as are the chances of being charged with a violation.47
As previously indicated, I also interviewed two management consult-
ants who specialize in designing "high-performance" work systems and
four management attorneys who specialize in EIP programs and section
8(a)(2) cases. Both groups were unanimous in their opinion that Elec-
tromation initially cast a significant chill on EIP programs but, over ap-
proximately the last four years, these fears have eased considerably if not
completely.4'
147. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
148. Michael LeRoy reaches a similar conclusion. See Michael LeRoy, Are Employers Con-
strained in the Use of Employee Participation Groups by Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act?, 20 J. LAB. RnS. 53, 66 (1999).
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I was told that two factors contributed to the easing of concern over
Electromation. One is a growing perception that the law still provides
enough "wiggle room" to set up EIP programs and remain within the
bounds of the law or not far beyond, albeit subject to some of the awk-
ward or counterproductive constraints noted above. The second, and the
more important according to the people interviewed, is that companies
increasingly realize that the probability of being charged with a section
8(a)(2) violation is very small. According to the attorneys, usually the
only time a nonunion company gets into legal trouble with its EIP pro-
grams is when a union begins an organizing campaign, discovers an in-
house employee committee, and files a section 8(a)(2) charge.149 But most
companies, I was told, view the probability of being a target of a union
organizing campaign as quite small and, indeed, several managers in
"high-performance" plants told me they had experienced no union activ-
ity in a decade or more. Furthermore, several attorneys ventured the
opinion that the NLRB under Chairman Gould has deliberately backed
away from prosecuting section 8(a)(2) cases in an attempt to forestall
passage of the TEAM Act or similar legislation. Finally, even if a com-
pany is ultimately found guilty of a section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice,
the typical penalty is modest-the Board issues a cease and desist order
and requires the company to display the order prominently in the work-
place.150
For these reasons, the managers, attorneys, and consultants inter-
viewed for this study believed that the restrictions contained in the
NLRA on "company unions" are having a less adverse impact on legiti-
mate EIP programs than was initially feared after the Electromation deci-
sion came down in 1992. In effect, some companies have found ways, not
always welcome or efficient but nonetheless serviceable, to live with the
law, while others have chosen to quietly go beyond it, operating what one
person described to me as "stealth" employee involvement committees.
It would be incorrect, however, to say that Electromation is having no
effect on nonunion EIP programs. Both managers and attorneys stressed
that, despite the small probability of being charged with a section 8(a)(2)
violation and the small penalties assessed if found guilty, most companies
want to stay within the boundaries of the law as a matter of business eth-
ics. Furthermore, most companies understandably want to avoid both the
large financial costs and public embarrassment associated with litigation.
149. See Rundle, supra note 72, at 166 (finding that of the 58 section 8(a)(2) cases between
1972 and 1993 in which the NLRB ordered a committee disestablished, only two involved an
employee committee in which there was neither an organizing campaign underway nor commis-
sion of one or more other unfair labor practices by the employer).
150. See, e.g., Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 998.
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Section 8(a)(2) litigation can drag out for years on appeal and typically
imposes significant costs of diverted management attention, organiza-
tional turmoil, and employee demoralization."' Finally, some managers
said they also did not want to provide unions with a pretext for filing an
unfair labor practice charge or otherwise harassing the company, and
thus they deliberately restrict the expansiveness and scope of their EIP
efforts.
The majority of managers, consultants, and attorneys interviewed for
this study believed that a substantial proportion of companies would
modestly expand their EIP programs in terms of the breadth and depth
of activities delegated to employee representation committees if it were
legal to do so. One manager, for example, said that he would empower
the employee and management representatives on the plant compensa-
tion committee to determine, subject to certain policy guidelines estab-
lished by top management, the size of the quarterly gainsharing bonus for
production employees. Another said she had formed a joint employee-
management team to investigate employee complaints about the plant's
vacation schedule, research the issues and alternatives, and then present
the information to her for her final decision. Had the law allowed, she
said, she would have chosen to interact with the team in the decision-
making process so that there was a greater element of mutuality in the
final product. Such chilling effects, my subjects indicated, are common.
While most nonunion companies would probably expand their EIP
programs "on the margin," a smaller number would probably go further.
Nonetheless, most subjects indicated that it was unlikely that most com-
panies would go so far as to establish, as proponents of the TEAM Act
fear, formal representational structures equivalent to the "company un-
ions" of the 1920s and 1930s. The subjects cited four reasons for this.
First, these types of formal plant- or company-wide structures are too
cumbersome, costly, and time consuming-particularly with the increas-
ing emphasis on operational flexibility and decentralization of decision-
making. Second, many respondents doubted that modern "company-
unions" would provide much additional benefit, either in improved effi-
ciency and customer service or improved employee morale, over what
151. The case of EFCO Manufacturing Company is illustrative. EFCO was found guilty of
violating section 8(a)(2) by an administrative law judge in 1993 and appealed the decision to the
NLRB in 1995, but the Board did not rule on the appeal until December 31, 1998. See EFCO
Corp., 327 N.L.R.B. 71 (1998). Chris Fuldner, CEO of the company, stated: "These proceedings
did not come without significant costs. Aside from the distaste of being treated as though we
were criminals, we also spent in the neighborhood of about $150,000 in defending ourselves."
He further reported that the company was hamstrung in its efforts to restructure its employee
involvement activities and move forward with a new plan given the NLRB's long delay in issu-
ing a decision on the case. Chris Fuldner, Employee Involvement and Section 8(a)(2) at EFCO
Manufacturing, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11.
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can be attained from smaller scale, more focused EIP activities. Third,
many companies like to foster an organizational culture that emphasizes
individual treatment and respect and thus shy away from formal systems
of employee representation, which tend to create a sense of collective
identity among employees and a collective approach to problem-solving.
Fourth, managers worry that in-house employee committees may become
the launching pad for union organization of the company. One manager
described in-house committees as "pet bears" and said that if not treated
well they can quickly turn on the company and get out of control .
These negative features notwithstanding, the interview subjects be-
lieved that a small minority of firms would nevertheless choose to oper-
ate formal, plant- or company-wide employee committees and councils if
permitted by the law. Examples cited were the formal employee repre-
sentation plans at the Polaroid and Donnelly corporations, both of which
had recently been ordered disestablished by the NLRB."' Partly, it was
felt, companies such as these adopt formal systems of employee represen-
tation due to the overriding importance attached by their founders or top
executives to fair dealing with employees or the fostering of a "family"
corporate culture. Also important is that, in very large companies, and
especially those experiencing organizational stress, a formal system of
employee representation can be an effective method of promoting im-
proved communication between top executives and shopfloor workers
and fostering a win-win approach to resolving potentially divisive issues.
C. Union Avoidance
Since the issue of union avoidance is central to the controversy sur-
rounding nonunion employee representation committees and section
8(a)(2), I devoted considerable time to this subject in my field interviews.
Reported below is a synopsis of my findings.
As described in Part II of this Article, the view of supporters of sec-
tion 8(a)(2) is that employers typically use nonunion employee commit-
tees to coerce and intimidate workers into avoiding bona fide trade un-
ions or, alternatively, to create a climate of opinion in the plant that
steers employees' attitudes against outside representation."
4
152. The "pet bear" metaphor is also reported in Daphne Taras & Jason Copping, When
Pet Bears Go Wild: Triggering Union Certifications from Joint Industrial Councils (unpublished
paper presented at the 1996 meeting of the Canadian Industrial Relations Association) (on file
with the author).
153. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra
note 1, at 41-42; Gillian Flynn, Team Act: What It Is and What It Can Do for You, PERSONNEL
J., Feb. 1996, at 85.
154. See Barenberg, supra note 110, at 767 ("[T]he historical evidence shows that company
unionism was widely coercive and manipulative .... [T]here is also undeniable evidence that
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The management executives, consultants, and attorneys interviewed
for this study provided a different perspective. It is true that no manager
I interviewed expressed even a neutral attitude toward union organiza-
tion and that most were explicitly committed to maintaining a union-free
status. Thus, there is no pretense that EIP is not a part of a union avoid-
ance strategy, as the companies' entire human resource program is, in
part, crafted with this goal in mind. But, from the perspective of the peo-
ple interviewed, in thinking about the social utility of nonunion employee
committees it is crucial to distinguish between the types of employers that
use them and the objectives they are intended to serve.
To illustrate this point, I will distinguish-for the sake of discussion-
two types of companies: "high-road employers" and "low-road employ-
ers."' ' In reality, many companies fall somewhere in the middle. The
high-road employers are run by well-trained, professional managers who
earn profits for the company by emphasizing innovation, quality prod-
ucts, good customer service, efficiency in production and administration,
and fair treatment of employees. These companies seek to remain union-
free, but typically pursue this goal through a strategy of "union substitu-
tion."'56 In a union substitution strategy, the employer establishes human
resource policies and practices-such as above-market wages, job secu-
rity, a formal dispute-resolution process, and a culture of respect and fair
dealing-intended not only to eliminate most of the sources of discontent
that motivate employees to seek union representation but also to give
employees more than they could hope to gain through collective bar-
gaining.'57 John R. Commons, founder of the field of industrial relations,
had these employers in mind when he commented seventy years ago,
"[f]rom 10 percent to 25 percent of American employers may be said to
be so far ahead of the game that trade unions can not reach them. Condi-
tions are better, wages are better, security is better, than unions can actu-
collaborative organizations can degenerate if in-house teams and representatives become
'integrated' into coercive or psychologically manipulative managerial structures.").
155. The distinction between high-road and low-road employers is made in DANIEL QUINN
MILLs, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 191-93 (4th ed. 1989), although he uses the labels
"better-standards" and "low-standards."
156. THOMAS KOCHAN & HARRY KATZ, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATONS 190-94 (2d ed. 1988). See generally ROBERT OZANNE, A CENTURY OF LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1968) (providing a case study of union substitution at the Interna-
tional Harvester Company in the pre-NLRA period).
157. See FRED FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION COMPANIES (1980)
(describing the human resource practices of modem-day companies pursuing a union substitu-
tion strategy); Daphne Taras, Evolution of Nonunion Representation in Canada, 20 J. LAB. RES.
31, 45 (1999) (stating, of progressive Canadian firms with nonunion representation councils, that
"[t]hese companies, and Dofasco and Husky are exemplars, provide benefits the unions in their
industries could not deliver: significant profit-sharing schemes, and in Husky's case, a lavish
child-care centre for employee families").
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ally deliver to their members."'58 In effect, these employers fend off un-
ions with the velvet glove of good business practice and generous treat-
ment of employees.
The other types of companies are the low-road employers. Whether
due to unprofessional management, poor products, or depressed market
conditions, these companies tend to be only marginally profitable. Either
out of short-term greed, or the pressure to survive, the low-road em-
ployer takes a "win-lose" approach to human resource management,
paying wages and benefits only as necessary to keep a workforce, prac-
ticing employment-at-will, skimping on safety and training, and adopting
an "if you don't like it here, you can leave" attitude toward employee
relations.159 While workers at the high-road employer typically feel satis-
fied with and well treated by their employer, those who work for low-
road employers are more likely to feel just the opposite. One response is
to quit and seek work elsewhere, but another that many workers of low-
road employers pursue is representation by an independent labor un-
ion." ° Like the high-road company, the low-road employer also wants to
remain union-free but typically adopts a different strategy to reach this
goal. This strategy is called "union suppression."'' The essence of the
union suppression strategy is to use coercion and fear to dissuade or pre-
vent workers from exercising their rights to join a union and engage in
collective bargaining. In some cases the tools of coercion and fear are
within the law, if not commonly accepted ethical principles, such as fos-
tering racial divisions among the workers and spreading rumors of moral
turpitude about union leaders. Often, however, tactics used are illegal,
such as widespread firing of union sympathizers, spying on union meet-
ings, and spreading rumors about possible plant closing.'62
Nonunion employee representation committees are found among
both high- and low-road employers. But the objectives they serve, and
158. JOHN R. COMMONS, INDUSTRIAL GovERNMENT 263 (1921).
159. For examples of low-road employers, see generally LAWRENCE J. OUELLET, PEDAL
TO THE METAL: THE WORK LivEs OF TRUCKERS (1994); Tony Horwitz, 9 to Nowhere: These
Six Jobs are Dull, Dead-End, Sometimes Dangerous, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at Al; Dana
Milbank, New Collar Work- Telephone Sales Reps Do Unrewarding Jobs That Few Can Abide,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,1993, at 1.
160. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 86, at 43, 59 (reporting from a 1994 employee
survey that one-third of American workers are discontented with their jobs and 32% of nonun-
ion workers say they would vote for a union if given an opportunity); see also MILLS, supra note
155, at 197-98; Bruce E. Kaufman, The Future of the Labor Movement, LAB. L.J. 474 (1997);
Hoyt Wheeler & John McClendon, The Individual Decision To Unionize, in THE STATE OF THE
UNIONS 47 (George Strauss et al. eds., 1991).
161. KOCHAN & KATZ, supra note 156, at 190-94.
162. See generally JOHN J. LAWLER, UNIONIZATION AND DEUNIONIZATION 79-117 (1990)
(describing union suppression tactics); Bruce E. Kaufman & Paula Stephan, The Role of Man-
agement Attorneys in Union Organizing Campaigns, 16 J. LAB. RES. 339 (1995) (same).
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the manner in which they are formed and operated, are typically quite
different.
Common to both kinds of employers is a desire to make profit and
remain union-free. Like the progressive welfare capitalist firms of the
1920s, high-road employers seek to attain these goals through a coopera-
tive, win-win human resource management strategy.1'6 The emphasis in
this strategy is on treating workers as "human resources," building a mu-
tuality of interests between employees and the firm, and fostering a sense
of fair dealing and common enterprise-all of which is intended to un-
leash high levels of employee work effort, dedication to product quality
and superior service, strong loyalty to the company, and a spirit of team-
work and self-sacrifice for the common good.'64 Some of the high-road
employers will look at nonunion forms of employee representation and
decide against using them, either for philosophical or pragmatic business
reasons-just as some prominent welfare capitalist firms did in the
1920s. 65 Many others, however, will adopt some form of employee repre-
sentation, often in a decentralized, small-scale manner but in other cases
on a plant- or company-wide basis. Importantly, the high-road employer
will generally not wait to implement nonunion committees until the last
moment, when employee dissatisfaction is boiling over and a union or-
ganizing campaign has begun, but will inaugurate them early on as part of
a forward-looking, progressive package of workplace practices aimed at
preventing both employee dissatisfaction and a union campaign through
fair treatment and greater empowerment.' 66 As another sign of these
163. Examples of high road employers with employee representation plans can be found in
both the 1930s and 1990s. With respect to the former, Canby Balderston describes that, in 1931,
Forbes magazine sponsored a competitive selection process to identify the company with "the
soundest worker-management relations." CANBY BALDERSTON, EXECUTIVE GUIDANCE OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, at v (1935). Twenty-five companies were selected for honorable men-
tion, twenty of which were nonunion. Fourteen of these nonunion companies had an employee
representation plan. The winner of the competition was Leeds & Northrup. In describing why
the company was selected, Balderston stated: "It is natural to expect that a program honored in
this signal fashion should have the usual arrangements that one expects to find in a firm with
advanced personnel policies, that is employee representation, retirement annuities, group insur-
ance, and systematic guidance of wage rates and promotion." Id. at 141 (emphasis added). In
the 1990s, leading companies, such as Polaroid, Donnelly, and Herman Miller, have had broad-
based employee representation groups-dating back to 1949 in the case of Polaroid. Similar to
the accolades given to Leeds & Northrup, Polaroid, Donnelly, and Herman Miller were all se-
lected as among the one hundred best companies to work for in America. See ROBERT
LEVERING ET AL., THE 100 BEST COMPANIES TO WORK FOR IN AMERIcA (1984).
164. See KOCHAN & OSTERMAN, supra note 22; Michael Beer & Bert Spector, Human Re-
source Management: The Integration of Industrial Relations and Organizational Development, in
2 RESEARCH IN PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RESoURCE MANAGEMENT 261-98 (Gerald Ferris
ed., 1984); Kaufman, supra note 2, at 264-71.
165. An example of a 1920s-era welfare capitalist firm that did not use employee represen-
tation is the Endicott Johnson Shoe Company. See Gerald Zahavi, Negotiated Loyalty: Welfare
Capitalism and the Shoeworkers of Endicott Johnson, 1920-1940, 70 J. AM. HIST. 602 (1983).
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companies' commitment to positive employee relations, they will main-
tain their representation plans even in periods of financial exigency and a
weak-to-nonexistent union threat.
Working for high-road employers is not necessarily Heaven on Earth,
and employees may well chafe at the companies' paternalism, feel dissat-
isfaction with certain aspects of the job, or resent cut-backs made during
an economic downturn or as part of a corporate restructuring. 7 Further,
it is certainly the case that the nonunion councils and committees oper-
ated by the high-road employers exist primarily to serve the employers'
interests and will continue to survive and prosper only as long as they
promote this end. The bottom line for most of the workers at high-road
employers, however, is that no superior alternatives are readily attain-
able. Quitting is an option, but the chances of finding a better place of
work are slim. Likewise, union representation is also an option, but it is
not clear that a union can materially improve work conditions at the
high-road employer. In addition, most employees at these companies are
repelled by the adversarialism inherent in collective bargaining and the
prospect of open warfare with the employer1 6
166. Mark Harshaw, Acting Director of Human Resource at Dofasco, Ltd., describes the
origin of the company's representation committees in Nonunion Employee Representation at
Dofasco, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11. Dofasco is a nonunion
Canadian steel maker and uses several types of nonunion employee representation committees.
Harshaw explains that the company was founded in 1912 and the first representation committee
was introduced in 1938 to administer the company's newly created savings and profit-sharing
plans. He states:
Contrary to some opinions, union avoidance wasn't the driving force for a lot of our
employee relations work.... Because the company was initially was run by a family
[the Shermans], it came to think of itself as a family and tried to establish that kind of
relationship .... Over the years, a very strong culture developed on the cornerstone of
the 'Golden Rule'.... In 1938 they introduced profit-sharing. All employees could
share in the wealth of the company while at the same time providing them with an in-
centive to create that wealth through their collective efforts.
Id.
167. Corporate restructurings and downsizings often lead to employee anger and demorali-
zation even at the best-managed companies. See PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK
79-84 (1997). The Personnel Board Council of Company C described in the case studies that
were reported in Part V of this Article was established after a three-year period of drastic cost
cutting and consequent deterioration in employee morale and commitment.
168. Cathy Cone, an employee member of a representation council at Delta Air Lines,
states:
The members of the council share the opinion that the entire purpose of employee
representation is to shift the focus of the front-line and management away from an ad-
versarial struggle over the terms and conditions of employment to cooperation and
mutual gain.... Given that this is what we believe to be our purpose, it puts us in di-
rect opposition to a union's purpose.
Cathy Cone, Nonunion Employee Representation at Delta Air Lines: An Employee Delegate's
View, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11.
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Nonetheless, critics of nonunion employee councils claim they are in-
herently undemocratic and subversive of employee rights and interests."'
But closer examination of this argument, according to the individuals I
interviewed, calls it into question. They note, first, that in fairness it must
be recognized that a number of labor unions are imperfectly democratic
organizations and rank and file members are sometimes largely disen-
franchised in terms of control over the leadership and the union's affairs.
Indeed, during the 1920s and 1930s, when critics of employer-created
plans condemned them as shams, a number of the trade unions were
highly autocratic and ,in a number of cases, subject to significant corrup-
tion.'70 Some unions today continue to suffer from these problems.
171
Thus, employer-created plans have to be judged not against the ideal of
industrial democracy touted by proponents of unions but against the ac-
tual governance practices of unions. Second, the defenders of company-
created plans admit that nearly all nonunion councils and committees are
"dominated" by management, in the sense of being created, financed,
and operated by the company. But domination does not mean that they
are necessarily objectionable on moral or ethical grounds, or are anti-
thetical to employee interests. After all, it is equally true that all other
aspects of a nonunion company's human resource policy are similarly
"dominated"-such as its compensation policy, training programs, and
staffing decisions-but no one seriously argues that these policies should
therefore be decided by majority vote of the employees or declared ille-
gal because they conflict with basic democratic beliefs and institutions.
Rather, precisely because the high-road employer seeks to gain competi-
tive advantage through a cooperative, win-win strategy, the "dominated"
employment practices put in place are deliberately designed to foster
169. See Hearings on S. 295 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
105th Congress (1997) (statement of Jonathan Hiatt) ("We urge the Committee to take it to
heart that section 8(a)(2) stands for a very simple-and basic-proposition.... Employer
dominated representation is inherently illegitimate and inimical to the exercise of full freedom
of association."); Morris, supra note 70, at 28.
170. See GORDON L. HOSTETrER & THOMAS QuINN BEESLEY, IT'S A RACKET! (1929).
Thomas Eliot, a self-professed "New Dealer" who worked in the Rooselvelt Administration as
a deputy to Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins, recounts in his autobiography:
While I was all for upholding the workers' rights under Section 7a, and highly critical
of employers who denied them those rights, I was not automatically pro-union. Far
from it. Frequently I wrote [to my family in 1933] scornfully about the leaders of some
of the major A.F. of L. building trades, calling them 'a bunch of racketeers in league
with a lot of the building contractors."'
THoMAs H. ELIOT, RECOLLECrIONS OF THE NEW DEAL: WHEN THE PEOPLE MATTERED 56-
57 (1992).
171. See, e.g., Casey Ichniowski & Ann Preston, The Persistence of Organized Crime in New
York City Construction: An Economic Perspective, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 549 (1989);
Gregory Kannar, Making the Teamsters Safe for Democracy, 102 YALE L.J. 1645, 1646-47
(1993).
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worker satisfaction and loyalty.'7 Thus, one method through which this is
accomplished is above-market wages; another is promises of job security;
yet another is some form of nonunion employee representation commit-
tee that provides for some measure of joint decisionmaking, employee
voice in company affairs, and a formal system for dispute resolution.
These committees are thus not instruments of exploitation or coercion
any more than high wages and good working conditions are. It is indeed
true that all of these positive work conditions are provided by nonunion
firms in order to make more profit but the end result is that employees,
and society as a whole, are better off with these conditions than without
them.
The picture is quite different if we look at low-road employers. As
noted earlier, low-road employers treat workers as commodities to be
hired for as little as possible, worked hard for as long as needed, and then
let go with minimal fuss and expense. 74 The cooperative, win-win strat-
egy of high-road employers is unattractive to these companies, partly be-
cause they cannot afford it, partly because they do not have the manage-
ment expertise or large organizational size to implement it, and partly
because they can motivate employees to work hard with methods that are
cheaper or more effective than high wages and fair treatment. 75 Exam-
ples include fear of being fired in a depressed job market, tight supervi-
sion, a plethora of control mechanisms and punitive sanctions, and pro-
duction technologies, including assembly lines, that allow management to
control the pace of work.17 Nonunion employee councils thus hold little
172. See Foulkes, supra note 157; MILLS, supra note 155, at 194-96.
173. David Boone, Manager of the Production Operations Division of Imperial Oil, Ltd.,
states, "Maintaining an effective nonunion form of representation consumes considerable man-
agement and employee effort and has tangible costs.... Even so, there is no doubt in my mind
that the effort pays off in terms of better business results and a rewarding collaborative work
environment." David Boone, Operation of the Production District Joint Industrial Council at
Imperial Oil, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11.
174. Whiting Williams described numerous examples of exploitative and onerous employ-
ment conditions at low road employers of the early 1920s. See WHITING WILLIAMS, WHAT'S
ON THE WORKER'S MIND (1920). For examples from recent times, see sources cited supra note
159.
175. See JOHN R. COMMONS, Industrial Relations, in TRADE UNIONISM AND LABOR
PROBLEMS 1, 7 (2d series 1921). Commons describes the motivational methods of low road em-
ployers by stating:
We have been going on the theory that in order to get efficiency, in order to get out-
put, in order to get laborers to work, there must be some kind of penalty held over the
workingman-the penalty of unemployment, the penalty of being discharged if he
does not work, if he does not do his duty, if he is not on the job. It is then that he suf-
fers the penalty of being discharged from his job. Our method has been the rough
method ....
Id.; see also JACOBY, supra note 18, at 20.
176. See, e.g., MILLS, supra note 155, at 192; Horwitz, supra note 160; Milbank, supra note
160.
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allure for low-road employers as a part of their long-term human re-
source strategy.'n
Just as the workplace at high-road employers is not Heaven on Earth,
the workplace at low-road employers is not necessarily Hell on Earth.
Low-road employers, after all, are constrained by market forces to pay a
certain level of wages and benefits in order to recruit and retain a work-
force. They know that a certain amount of training and job security is
necessary for employee morale and productivity and are restrained from
undue arbitrariness and callousness toward labor by the threat of both
unions and lawsuits. Nonetheless, employees at low-road employers are
far more likely to be dissatisfied with the terms and conditions of work,
to perceive the employment relationship as win-lose, and to feel the need
for both outside protection and greater leverage in dealing with the man-
agement. Many of these employees, relative to their counterparts at
high-road employers, are thus likely to have a high level of interest in
union representation."9
Because low-road employers typically invest little in positive em-
ployee relations practices, they are far more likely to experience a union
organizing campaign.'O One common response is to call in a labor attor-
ney or consultant to take command of the company's side of the cam-
paign.18 Given that the typical union representation election takes place
six to eight weeks after a petition is filed with the NLRB, the company
and its consultants have relatively little time to salve the employees' an-
ger and beat back the union. Toward this end, they try a number of tac-
tics-sometimes illegal ones.1  In a positive vein, the attorney or consult-
ant will often interview supervisors and foremen to determine the source
of employee discontent and make recommendations to top management
on what needs to be done to correct the situation. In a more negative
vein, low road companies often show anti-union videotapes in captive
audience sessions, make veiled threats about loss of jobs if the union wins
or promises about wage increases and other rewards if the union is voted
down, or fire or otherwise discriminate against union activists."'
177. See JACOBY, supra note 18, at 190-95.
178. See MILLS, supra note 155, at 192.
179. See Jack Fiorito et al., The Impact of Human Resource Policies on Union Organizing,
26 INDUS. REL. 113 (1987) (demonstrating that unions have a higher win rate in NLRB elec-
tions in firms that do not have progressive human resource practices).
180. See id. This fact is also revealed in an unpublished AFL-CIO report. DEPARTMENT OF
ORGANIZATION AND FIELD SERVICES, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO ORGANIZING SURVEY: 1986-87
NLRB ELECrIONS, at 8 (1989) ("The presence of quality of work life programs are disastrous
for unions; only 17% of elections were successful where such programs are present.").
181. See LAWLER, supra note 162, at 79-117; Kaufman & Stephan, supra note 162.
182. See Kaufman & Stephan, supra note 162, at 447.
183. See id.
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One union avoidance tactic is to form a nonunion employee commit-
tee or council quickly. This accomplishes several purposes. On the posi-
tive side, the committee may quickly identify problem areas unknown to
top management, such as a foreman with a record of sexual harassment
or widespread employee dissatisfaction with vacation scheduling, and
thus contribute to a win-win solution.1" But the negative consequences
are likely to outweigh the positive. Since low-road employers typically
establish nonunion employee committees only shortly before or during a
union organizing drive, it is far more likely that the primary motive in
doing so is short-term union avoidance.1 s
Establishment of an employee committee may contribute to this end
in several ways. 86 It can, for example, buy the employer more time by de-
ceptively convincing the employees that the company is seriously inter-
ested in resolving their complaints and promoting improved relations. As
a result, the employees may call off the organizing campaign or the union
may lose the support of a majority of the workers. Once the union is de-
feated, the employer may quickly lose interest in promoting improved
conditions, renege on promises and commitments made during the cam-
paign, ferret out union sympathizers and fire them, and disband the em-
ployee council or let it lapse into disuse. In this case, the net effect of the
employee council is to help squash the union organizing drive with little
real improvement in the conditions that precipitated the union drive in
the first place. Then the employees and union must start over, often from
a weakened position.
Nonunion employee councils can serve the union avoidance objec-
tives of low-road employers in other ways. Employers use them, for ex-
ample, to disseminate anti-union propaganda to workers. The worker
representatives can communicate anti-union threats or promises that
management is legally restrained from making, and the committees can
be used to identify union sympathizers among the workers1 7
184. In Magan Medical Clinic, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994), for example, the employer
set up a grievance committee shortly after a union-organizing drive began for the purpose of
airing employee discontents with wages, hours, and treatment by supervisors.
185. In Garney Morris, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 101 (1993), the company formed an employee
committee shortly after a union organizing drive began and strongly encouraged employees to
participate in it. Gamey Morris simultaneously committed numerous unfair labor practices,
such as discharge of union supporters. In that case, the A.L.J. concluded, "[i]t is hard to imagine
any conduct on the part of an employer which could more thoroughly decimate an organizing
drive and more surely render a Board election meaningless." Id. at 102.
186. See OZANNE, supra note 129, at 146-56; Daphne Taras, Nonunion Representation:
Complement or Threat to Unions, in 1 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 281 (1998); see also In re Republic Steel Corp.,
9 N.L.R.B. 219, 230, 23649, 256-61, 338-42 (1938).
187. See Barenberg, supra note 110, at 777-824. For an historical example of the use of
company unions for this purpose, see OZANNE, supra note 156, at 146-52 (describing the ma-
nipulation of the company union by the International Harvester Company). In a modem-day
Yale Law & Policy Review
In the short run, nonunion employee committees are probably, on
net, a deterrent to unionization. At high-road employers, they are one
piece of a larger set of progressive human resource practices that keep
unions out by creating employment conditions that are far above the lo-
cal or industry average. At low-road employers, the committees are likely
to appear only during or shortly before an organizing campaign and are
one element of a larger set of anti-union practices that gain their effec-
tiveness by creating conditions of fear, misinformation, and division.
Whether these nonunion committees impede unionization over the
longer run, however, is uncertain. The conventional view is that they un-
dermine union strength, a view widely and strongly held by people in the
American labor movement.9 But the historical evidence from this coun-
try and contemporary evidence from others suggests that the long-run ef-
fect of nonunion committees is either neutral with respect to union
growth or even positive.' 9 The key features of these committees are, first,
they foster collective identity and collective action among nonunion
workers and, second, they raise the expectations of employees about the
way the firm is going to treat them. As long as these expectations are
met, the employees are typically satisfied and tend to reciprocate with
positive behaviors that make employee representation a good invest-
ment, such as lower turnover, better morale, greater loyalty, heightened
dedication, and, importantly, substantially decreased interest in an out-
side union. If these heightened expectations are dashed, however-for
example because of layoffs due to downsizing at a high-road employer or
example, Ryders Distribution, Inc., formed an employee committee shortly after a union or-
ganizing campaign commenced and instructed the employee representatives to poll other em-
ployees on their opinions about the company's employment practices and report the results to
management. The company offered $500 to each employee as an inducement to participate in
the representation program after employees initially expressed reservations. See Gely, supra
note 110, at 61.
188. Rundle notes that two studies find "that union win rates are exceptionally low where
an employee committee exists." Rundle, supra note 72, at 175.
189. See Herrnstadt, supra note 70, at 109 ("The creation of company-dominated unions is
still one method that employers are using to demonstrate their opposition to independent labor
organizations."); Rundle, supra note 72, at 166 (noting that of the 58 section 8(a)(2) cases that
went before the NLRB between 1972 and 1993, only two did not involve other unfair labor
practice charges and had not been established in the course of a union organizing drive).
190. See Taras, supra note 186. Concerning the traditional view that company unions hurt
long-run union growth, Taras states that "[t]here is meager evidence upon which to build this
case." Id. at 282. She goes on to observe:
[t]he outright banning of company unions does not necessarily offer advantages to un-
ions. The Canadian experience shows that company unions can assist in organizing, but
only in the context of a relatively healthy union movement.... There are few com-
plaints in Canada [where company unions are legal] that nonunion representation has
killed the vitality of union organizing in any way, and at least two unions in Canada
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broken promises of improved wages and conditions at a low-road em-
ployer-the positive feelings quickly evaporate and are replaced by in-
tensely negative ones, such as betrayal, anger, and disillusionment." '
These negative emotions, in turn, create psychological conditions that
propel workers toward unionization-a process the company has unin-
tentionally facilitated by, in effect, setting up an in-house organizing
committee for the union. As a union-avoidance device, therefore, em-
ployee representation is very much a double-edged sword that can just as
easily hurt as help employers in their quest to stay union-free.' 92
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
I consider in this Part the implications of the foregoing analysis for
the public policy debate over section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act engendered by the Electromation decision. The appropriate
place to begin this analysis is with an evaluation of the original rationale
for the inclusion of section 8(a)(2) in the NLRA in 1935.
A. Historical Evaluation of Section 8(a)(2)
The historical context with regard to passage of the NLRA was re-
viewed in Part II. Based on the facts developed there, I conclude that the
191. An official of the UAW stated of the employee representation committee established
at the Donnelly Company:
The Donnelly "Equity Committees" have not provided workers with any meaningful
voice in resolving grievances or improving their wages, benefits and other conditions
of employment. Instead, they have been a tool used by management to implement
policies dictated by top company officials. When workers became disillusioned with
the failure of the Equity Committees to address their grievances and to improve condi-
tions at the plant, they tried to form an independent union....
Herrnstadt, supra note 70, at 111.
192. See RAYMOND L. HOGLER & GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
AND LABOR LAW IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 50-56 (1992) (describing how the Steel
Workers Organizing Committee successfully took over the company unions set up by the steel
companies in 1936-1937 and the pivotal role the nonunion representation plans played in the
eventual triumph of independent unionism); John N. Schacht, Toward Industrial Unionism: Bell
Telephone Workers and Company Unions, 1919-1937, 16 LAB. HIST. 5 (1975) (explaining that
company unions helped Bell Telephone maintain nonunion status for several decades, but in the
late 1940s became a facilitating factor in the transition to independent unionism); see also Steve
Jeffreys, "Matters of Mutual Interest": The Unionization Process at Dodge Main, 1933-1939, in
ON THE LINE: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF AUTO WORK 100 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Stephen
Meyer eds., 1989). Jeffreys states:
The Joint Council helped to identify and then bring together a sizable element of the
Dodge Main plant's more articulate workers. Meetings of the fifty-three elected work-
ers' representatives gave the different areas of the highly concentrated plant a unity
they might otherwise have had considerable difficulty establishing. And in what was to
serve as a model for the rights of shop stewards, the scheme also gave the representa-
tives time off their work.... [the company also] allowed them to meet independ-
ently.... At such a meeting the first major step to full union organization of the plant
was taken.
Id. at 108-109.
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NLRA's ban on company unions, as accomplished through the combined
provisions of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2), was a policy mistake. This conclu-
sion follow from the following four observations:
1) Until the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in the
early months of the Roosevelt administration, nonunion employee repre-
sentation plans, or "company unions," had by and large received much
more praise than criticism. Particularly before the Great Depression
commenced in late 1929, even persons sympathetic to the cause of or-
ganized labor readily acknowledged that the nonunion representation
plans of the welfare capitalist employers of the 1920s were, in general, a
positive and praiseworthy innovation in employment practice."'
2) The welfare capitalist firms of the 1920s desired to remain union-
free and the representation plans were one element of their union avoid-
ance strategy. The key fact, however, is that their union avoidance strat-
egy was built on proactively establishing employment conditions that
made employees so satisfied that they did not desire a union. Thus, these
employers paid above-market wages, provided promises of job security,
offered a plethora of employee benefits, and trained supervisors and
foremen in the practice of human relations. 94
3) Much of the criticism of company unions stems from events and
developments unleashed by the Great Depression and, in particular, pas-
sage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in June 1933.' If the Roo-
sevelt administration had not decided to promote widespread collective
bargaining as one of its principal means of accomplishing economic re-
covery, most nonunion employers would never have taken the time and
expense to set up company unions, and hence the nonunion representa-
tion plans then in existence would have largely escaped condemnation as
anti-union shams.
4) Senator Robert Wagner, author of the National Labor Relations
Act, admitted that company unions promoted improved productivity and
employee relations on the shop floor but nevertheless sought their ban-
ishment because, in his view, they were inherently undemocratic and
were inimical to the New Deal economic recovery program."9 In par-
ticular, Wagner and Roosevelt believed company unions were unable to
stabilize wages, which they thought was essential to ending the econ-
omy's deflationary downturn. They also believed that company unions
193. See Leiserson, supra note 24, at 154 ("Perhaps the most significant contribution of Per-
sonnel Management, however, has been its development of employee representation.").
194. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 169-83; JACOBY, supra note 21, at 11-34; Bruce E.
Kaufman, Prior to the Wagner Act, supra note 14.
195. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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did not have the bargaining power to raise wages and thus augment
household purchasing power and aggregate demand.' 97
These observations betray the problematic nature of section 8(a)(2).
First, Wagner and allies adopted a seriously flawed approach to eco-
nomic recovery. Most modem economists believe that the quicker, surer
way to end the Depression would have been to use expansionary fiscal
and monetary policy.19 Monetary and fiscal policy not only can boost ag-
gregate demand more quickly and sharply than increased collective bar-
gaining but are also less harmful to the supply side of the economy' 99
Wagner's most potent argument for banning company unions was thus
predicated on an approach to economic recovery that, from today's per-
spective, was ill-considered and quite possibly counter-productive.
Second, Wagner and allies were probably correct to state that com-
pany unions were, at least in the short run and given the weak contempo-
rary protection of the right to organize, a deterrent to greater unioniza-
tion and collective bargaining&° They were wrong, however, to conclude
that this is necessarily against the public interest. The key consideration is
how and why they discourage unionization. When nonunion employee
committees and councils are used as part of a "high road," mutual-gain
employment strategy, society benefits from and should quite possibly en-
courage their useY21 Society benefits because the employee committees,
by promoting employee involvement in the workplace, promote greater
productivity, increased competitiveness of American industry, better jobs
and greater work satisfaction for employees, and a more participatory
and humane workplace.m If nonunion employee committees and coun-
cils are used primarily as an overt, reactive, and suppressive instrument
of union avoidance, on the other hand, they can harm the public interest
and should be banned.m
The harm done by nonunion employee committees, in this case, is
both economic and noneconomic. With regard to the former, economic
197. See id.
198. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: DELAYED RECOVERY
AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1929-1939, at 184-206 (1987); MICHAEL M. WEINSTEIN,
RECOVERY AND REDISTRIBUTION UNDER THE NIRA 146-47 (1980).
199. Collective bargaining leads to strikes, restrictive work rules, and other inflexibilities
that, ultimately, restrict the nation's ability to produce. Expansionary monetary policy, in con-
trast, stimulates aggregate demand by lowering interest rates and promoting more capital
spending. More capital spending on plant and equipment, in turn, augments the nation's ability
to produce.
200. As noted, the long-run effect of company unions may well be either neutral or positive
with respect to union growth over the longer term. See supra notes 191-192 and accompanying
text.
201. This argument is advanced in Kaufman & Levine, supra note 11.
202. See LAWLER, supra note 2, at 38; LEVINE, supra note 10, at 38-39.
203. See Kaufman & Levine, supra note 11.
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efficiency and competitiveness are often promoted by unionization of
low-road employers, because it ends exploitative wages and conditions,
forces these employers to pay a fuller measure of the social cost of labor
and motivates managers to run the firm in a more efficient manner.?"'
With regard to the latter, it is a basic constitutional and human right that
workers should have full freedom of association in the workplace, and
employer practices that infringe on this right contravene both national
law and public ethics.2 5 In the drafting of the NLRA, therefore, Wagner
should have sought to deter some types of company unions-but not all
of them. He should have crafted language that allowed high-road em-
ployers to operate nonunion representation plans for win-win purposes
but prevented their use as tools of union suppression.
Third, Wagner violated his own philosophical commitment to free-
dom of choice when he championed the ban on company unions. Wagner
justified the section 8(a)(2) ban on grounds that employers used com-
pany unions to abridge workers' rights to join trade unions and engage in
collective bargaining726 In protecting workers' rights to join unions, how-
ever, he contemporaneously abridged the equally important right of
workers to choose a nonunion form of employee representation.2
7
Moreover, events at the time clearly revealed that a significant propor-
tion of workers preferred company unions over trade unions-a fact that
Wagner must of have known first-hand.m
204. Economic theory shows that when a firm has some degree of market power over
wages, as in cases of monopsony and oligopsony, it can practice exploitation of workers by
paying subcompetitive wage rates. Unionization of this employer will end the exploitation by
raising wages closer to the competitive level, thereby promoting a more efficient allocation of
resources. See BRUcE E. KAUFMAN, THE EcONOMIcS OF LABOR MARKETS, 270-73 (4th ed.
1994). Unions can also internalize social costs and spur management to operate the firm more
efficiently. See DONALD R. STABILE, ACrIVIST UNIONISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIcS
OF SOLOMON BARKIN 50-57 (1993); Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor Markets and Employment
Regulation: The View of the "Old" Institutionalists, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 1, 34-35 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
205. See Barenberg, supra note 110, at 896 ("workers' right to participate in workplace
governance is as compelling as their right to participate in political governance"); id. at 899
("[W]orkplace participation rights are akin to inalienable aspects of personhood, like the right
to vote or to be free of slavery."). The Findings and Policy statement of the National Labor
Relations Act states in this regard: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
[to encourage] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and [to] protect the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing." 29 U.S.C. 151 (1998).
206. Wagner stated, in this regard, that "[w]hatever the men want to do... within a plant,
that is all right, only if it is the free choice of the men. Of course, we are all for that. That is all I
am seeking to do, to make the worker a free man to make his choice .... 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 9, at 440.
207. See also Barenberg, supra note 110, at 776, 825-29.
208. The National Labor Board, created in mid-1933 by executive order, and its successor,
the National Labor Relations Board (the "old" NLRB), created by executive order in mid-1934,
were established to resolve disputes over section 7(a) of the NIRA. Both were chaired by Wag-
ner. The boards held hundreds of secret ballot representation elections in the two years before
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Fourth, Wagner's position on company unions versus trade unions
suffered yet another logical inconsistency.2 In light of his position that
company unions posed a threat to the New Deal economic recovery pro-
gram because they could not take wages out of competition, he should
also have favored including provisions in the NLRA that promoted in-
dustrial unions over craft unions and the extension of collective bargain-
ing contracts to all nonunion firms in the industry (a policy that was im-
plemented in certain European countries). 10
B. Implications for Current Policy
What, then, is the appropriate public policy with respect to company-
created employee representation committees? In my opinion, labor
economist Sumner Slichter of Harvard University gave the correct an-
swer in his congressional testimony in 1934 on Senator Wagner's pro-
posed Labor Disputes Act (the forerunner of the NLRA).21" He stated:
The problem which impresses me as overwhelmingly important is not the one
of preventing the formation of the so-called "company union," because as a
practical matter I do not believe that can be done ... even if it were desirable
to do it.
But the problem is giving the independent labor organizations a fair oppor-
tunity to compete with the employee committees and to provide a method by
which, in an impartial manner, the wishes, the preferences of the employees
can be ascertained .... 212
Slichter's position is that both union and nonunion forms of employee
representation should be allowed by law. I believe he is correct in this
matter on two counts. First, on philosophical grounds, Slichter's position
is in accord with the principles of competition and free choice, which are
the NLRA. In these elections, workers were permitted to vote for no representation, trade un-
ion representation, or company union representation-unlike under the NLRA where the com-
pany union option is unavailable. In approximately 30% of these elections a majority of work-
ers voted to keep the company union and, overall, one-third of the votes cast in NLRB elections
between July 1934 and June 1935 were for company union representation. See LEO WOLMAN,
EBB AND FLow iN TRADE UNIONISM, 77-79 (1936). Since the NLRB only held elections where
a union was actively contesting representation, one can reasonably conjecture that the propor-
tion of the total workforce that would have voted for company union representation was higher
than one-third.
209. See also Kaufman, supra note 7, at 57.
210. Industrial unions organize all production workers in a particular industry regardless of
craft or skill, while craft unions organize only workers of a particular occupation. The market
reach of the former is thus much broader, allowing it to be more effective in standardizing
wages for all workers in an industry. See L. Hamburger, The Extension of Collective Bargaining
Agreements To Cover Entire Trades and Industries, 40 INT'L LAB. REv. 153 (1939) (discussing
the extension of collective bargaining agreements to nonunion firms in Europe).
211. Labor Disputes Act, S. 2926, 73d Cong. (1934).
212. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACr, supra note 9,
at 92.
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fundamental values in American society. A policy with regard to em-
ployee representation based on this principle is therefore more likely to
gain public support and political legitimacy. Second, Slichter's position is
also in accord with abundant theoretical and empirical evidence that
competition and free choice in both the economic and political spheres
best serves the public interest.2 This is because competition prevents in-
dividuals or social institutions from taking advantage of the public by ex-
ploiting monopoly positions and motivates them to serve their clients in
the most efficient manner. These considerations apply equally well to the
performance of alternative forms of employee representation.
The policy goal is to ensure that all forms of employee representation,
including union and nonunion varieties, generate as many win-win out-
comes as possible, which is to say that they should promote firms' inter-
ests in higher productivity and product quality and employees' interests
in improved conditions of work and equitable treatment. With regard to
nonunion forms of employee representation, public policy needs to pur-
sue a two-pronged approach to maximize these win-win outcomes.214
The first prong is to ensure competition and free choice by pursuing
economic policies that promote full employment and ease of access to
jobs. As noted in Section VI.C, all aspects of company HRM policy and
practice, including employee EIP committees, are management
"dominated" in a nonunion company in the sense that they are unilater-
ally established, financed, and operated by management. But manage-
ment domination does not necessarily give companies the power to use
HRM policies and practices in ways that are inimical to worker inter-
ests. 215 One key constraint on companies is employees' capacity to quit
one firm and find alternative employment at another. A firm may desire
to pay exploitatively low wages, require onerously long hours of work, or
force employees to submit grievances to a sham EIP committee, but it
will be prevented from doing so to the extent that its undesirable HRM
213. According to the fundamental welfare theorem of microeconomics, a market system of
perfect competition produces goods and services as efficiently as possible. See JAMES QuIRK &
RUBIN SAPOSNIK, INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY AND WELFARE
ECONOMICS 124-47 (1968). For a review of the literature on the positive effects of economic
and political democracy, see Robin Archer, The Philosophical Case for Economic Democracy,
in DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE 13 (Ugo Pagano & Robert
Rowthorn eds., 1996).
214. See Kaufman & Levine, supra note 11.
215. The idea that management has leverage to use employee representation plans to ille-
gitimately dominate workers is illustrated by Paul Weiler's remarks: "Once the employer has
established an EIP for whatever reason, its employees must accept the program.... Unlike the
decision about union representation, the only choice that workers have in this situation is to
keep or leave their jobs." PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 213 (1990).
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practices make it difficult to recruit and maintain a productive work-
force.
216
Hence, economic policies are needed that promote competition and
free choice in labor markets. The first place to start is to use macro-
economic fiscal and monetary policies to help achieve full employment.
When the labor market is flooded with numerous job seekers desperate
for work after an extended period of unemployment, firms find them-
selves in the superior bargaining position and can force upon employees
exploitative and unjust terms and conditions of employment2 1 7 In a full
employment labor market, on the other hand, firms are forced by the
scarcity of labor to practice all aspects of HRM, including the operation
of EIP committees, in ways that are win-win. A second employment pol-
icy that promotes competition and free choice in labor markets is antidis-
crimination law, so that workers of all racial groups and genders have
unobstructed access to alternative employment. A third such policy is
government-funded retraining programs, so that workers who are dis-
placed by new technology or foreign trade can acquire new skills and
hence more effectively compete for jobs in the labor market. The second
prong of public policy should be to ensure effective competition and free
choice in the "market" for employee representation. Nonunion employee
committees may be management-dominated, but employers are none-
theless constrained to operate them in win-win ways to the extent em-
ployees can quickly and costlessly obtain an alternative form of represen-
tation.2 8 Stated another way, management is strongly motivated to
operate nonunion employee representation committees in a responsible,
above-board maner to the extent that there is a viable threat from a un-
ion. Not only does an unfettered ability to quit the job and obtain work
elsewhere protect the workers' interests, so too does the unfettered abil-
ity to "quit" one form of representation at the company and obtain an-
other.
Public policy can promote competition and free choice in the market
for employee representation in several ways. Most fundamentally, em-
ployees need to be allowed to choose among as wide a range of alterna-
tive representational forms as possible, including the option of having no
representational agent.21 9 Thus, as Slichter argued, labor law should im-
216. See also Kaufman & Levine, supra note 11.
217. See JACOBY, supra note 18, at 20; Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor's Inequality of Bargaining
Power: Changes over Time and Implications for Public Policy, 10 J. LAB. RES. 285-88 (1989);
Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor's Inequality of Bargaining Power: Myth or Reality?, 12 J. LAB. RES.
150 (1991).
218. See Kaufman & Levine, supra note 11.
219. As I argue elsewhere, a good case can be made on economic efficiency grounds that
public policy should encourage various types of employee representation teams and councils in
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pose minimal constraints on the ability of nonunion employers to operate
employee representation committees. But, as Slichter also maintains, la-
bor law must also ensure that employees have a free and relatively un-
constrained ability to choose a different form of representation, such as
an independent labor union. A second requirement, therefore, is that la-
bor law provide employees with a readily accessible method to obtain in-
dependent representation if so desired.20 In keeping with American
democratic values, the most obvious solution is some form of govern-
ment-supervised, secret-ballot, union representation election. A third re-
quirement for competitive elections between representational agents is
that labor law must protect employees in their choice of a representa-
tional agent from undue forms of coercion and constraint. This can be ac-
complished by declaring illegal various suppressive practices by employ-
ers, such as discrimination against union activists and refusals to bargain.
One specific practice that might be prohibited is establishment of a com-
pany-created and -financed employee representation committee after a
union-organizing campaign has started, on the presumption that most of-
ten this action is an insubstantial, stopgap measure.
It is evident that, relative to conditions in the years prior to the pas-
sage of the NLRA in 1935, the United States has made considerable pro-
gress in fulfilling both the first and second prongs of the policy initiatives
needed for effective competition and free choice in employee representa-
tion. 2' With regard to the first, for example, labor markets have in the
the workplace, see Kaufman & Levine, supra note 11, but no such case can be made for the pro-
posal advanced in WEILER, supra note 215, at 282-306, that all workplaces be required by law to
have some form of employee representation group (with the possible exception of joint safety
and health committees in certain industries).
220. The ease with which employees should be able to obtain collective bargaining rights is
determined not only by the need to provide an effective check on the practices of nonunion em-
ployers but also by the economic and social effects of the unions once they are organized and
become ongoing concerns. If collective bargaining, on net, forces wages much above competi-
tive levels and results in other adverse practices, such as restrictive work rules and numerous
strikes, public policy should correspondingly reduce the ease with which unions can be
formed-or provide other means that prevent unions from engaging in these harmful practices.
If unions, on the other hand, promote improved productivity and efficacious resolution of dis-
putes, then union-joining should correspondingly be encouraged. Although the evidence is
mixed, a consensus exists that in terms of wage and benefit costs unions do push up wages con-
siderably above market levels. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do
UNIONS Do? (1984); KAUFMAN, supra note 204,583-623. My recommendation, as described in
Bruce E. Kaufman, A New Paradigm: Deregulating Labor Relations-Comment on Reynolds,
1996 J. LAB. RES. 129, 133, is to make union formation relatively easy through the changes in
law and NLRB administration described in this Article-thus protecting the interests of the dis-
advantaged and exploited in the labor market and providing an effective constraint on the prac-
tices of nonunion employers but at the same time blunting the monopoly power of established
unions by maintaining the right of employers to permanently replace strikers (subject to modest
restrictions to prevent blatant union busting). See Kaufman, supra note 204.
221. See generally KAUFMAN, supra note 204; Kaufman, supra note 204; Bruce Kaufman &
David Lewin, Is the NLRA Still Relevant to Today's Economy and Workplace?, 49 LAB. L.J.
1113, 1116-17 (1998).
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last three decades been much closer to the full employment level than in
the 1900-1935 era. Likewise, antidiscrimination laws, improved geo-
graphic and occupational labor mobility, and vastly higher levels of edu-
cation and training among the workforce have all contributed to more
open and competitive labor markets.m All of these factors substantially
reduce the ability of employers to exploit, coerce, or intimidate employ-
ees. Employer domination of labor markets has not been completely
eliminated, however, for pockets of substantial unemployment-such as
in low-income inner-city areas and communities struck by a large plant
closure-continue to exist even in the most prosperous of years; the
economy occasionally experiences substantial amounts of involuntary
unemployment during business cycle recessions; and certain types of
workers continue to face various constraints and barriers in the job mar-
ket.m
A similarly mixed assessment holds with respect to progress on the
second prong of public policy. Here too the situation in the last three
decades is substantially improved over the pre-NLRA years.
The passage of the NLRA in 1935 did much to level the playing field
for independent labor unions, just as Slichter advocated. 224 In particular,
prior to the NLRA the only way unions could gain recognition and col-
lective bargaining rights was through economic force, such as strikes and
boycotts.m This precipitated considerable violence and economic disrup-
tion, and often the unions were not strong enough to prevail against
large, well-established employers. Further, the employers were largely
unconstrained in their use of a plethora of union suppression tactics, such
as spies, mass firings of union activists, and refusals to bargain.22 The net
effect was that employee choice with respect to independent union repre-
sentation was seriously constrained and often frustrated. Given this lack
of competition and free choice, workers who felt dissatisfied with, or un-
justly treated by, employer-created "company unions" were relatively
powerless to obtain an alternative form of representation2 7 Hence, em-
222. See generally Kaufman, supra note 204.
223. A review and assessment of the evidence on employer power in labor markets is pro-
vided in William Boal & Michael Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market, 35 J. ECON.
LrrERATURE 86 (1997).
224. See generally Kaufman, supra note 204; Kaufman & Lewin, supra note 222.
225. See IRVING BERNSTE IN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLIcY 4-17
(1950) (describing union organizing before the Wagner Act as having a "long and bloody his-
tory").
226. See JEROLD AUERBACH, LABOR AND LIBERTY: THE LAFOLLETFE COMMITTEE AND
THE NEW DEAL 13-33 (1966).
227. A good example is in the case of United States v. Weirton Steel Co., 10 F. Supp. 55 (D.
Del. 1935), in which the employer unilaterally established an employee representation plan in
1933 and refused to permit a government-supervised secret ballot union certification election
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ployers gained considerable power and discretion to operate these com-
mittees in ways that went against the interests of both employee and the
public.
Enactment of the NLRA considerably ameliorated these forms of il-
legitimate employer domination. The union representation election es-
tablished by the Act gives workers the opportunity to vote for independ-
ent union representation in a secret ballot election.m Furthermore, the
Act proscribes a wide range of employer unfair labor practices that had
been used to coerce and intimidate employee votes.229 Finally, the Act
created the NLRB to administer the Act's provisions and seek relief in
the federal courts for infractions of its provisions.2 Formerly, employers
once fired union activists with impunity and refused to negotiate with
union representatives. These actions were made illegal by the NLRA,
and their occurrence and severity were substantially reduced.
As with competition on the demand-side of the labor market, compe-
tition and free choice in the market for representational agents, while
improved, is not yet unconstrained. Although considerable debate and
conflicting evidence exists on the matter,' I do not believe that the pro-
tections of the right to organize contained in the NLRA and the proce-
dures used by the NLRB to administer the Act guarantee in all respects
the conditions necessary for effective, unconstrained employee free
choice with regard to union representation.
In particular, financial penalties against employers for unfair labor
practices associated with an organizing campaign are too weak to deter
the unprincipled or determined employer who wishes to keep out the
union. 2 Indeed, analysis of NLRB data reveals that the incidence of ille-
gal firing has increased from one in twenty elections, adversely affecting
one in 700 union supporters, to one in every four elections, victimizing
one in fifty union supporters.23 Critics of the NLRA note, in this regard,
despite considerable evidence that employees desired outside union representation. See
HOGLER & GRENIER, supra note 192, at 43-48.
228. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1994).
229. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
230. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1994).
231. Compare Henry S. Farber & Alan B. Krueger, Union Membership in the United States:
The Decline Continues, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE
DIRECrIONS 105, 130 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (finding that the de-
cline in worker demand for unionization is due largely to employees' greater satisfaction with
their jobs), with Phil Comstock & Maier B. Fox, Employer Tactics and Labor Law Reform, in
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 16, at 90, 98 (concluding that
employer coercion is an important reason for the decline in unionization).
232. See, e.g., Richard W. Hurd & Joseph B. Uehlein, Patterned Responses to Organizing:
Case Studies of the Union-Busting Convention, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN
LABOR LAW, supra note 16, at 61, 69 (1994); see also WEILER, supra note 215, at 234-41.
233. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra
note 12, at 70.
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that in cases of illegal discharge of an employee the usual remedy is rein-
statement with back pay, minus earnings from other work. In 1990 the
average back pay award was only $2749.23 By way of comparison, em-
ployers who illegally dismiss an employee for reasons related to gender
or racial discrimination are liable for much larger penalties, including
payments for financial and psychological harm to the victim as well as
punitive damages for willful misconduct that can run into the millions of
dollars.25 It is also worth noting that the monetary penalty for an em-
ployer's refusal to bargain is effectively zero, since the typical remedy is
an NLRB order not to repeat this conduct.26
A second problematic area is the NLRB's typical delay in holding a
representation election. The median time between a union's petition for
a representation election and the holding of the election is roughly fifty
days (seven weeks), with twenty percent of cases taking more than sixty
days.27 A frequent cause of delay in the holding of representation elec-
tions is that legal challenges by either a union or an employer on matters
such as the appropriate bargaining unit must be resolved prior to the
election. The optimal length of time between petition and election is a
complicated matter; both employer and employee interests must be
weighed. For example, holding an election after only one week may be
undesirable on two counts: It does not give the employer sufficient time
to determine the issues behind the union drive and present counter-
arguments, and it does not provide employees enough time for cool re-
flection and deliberate choice. On the other hand, scheduling an election
date two or more months after the petition unduly favors the employer,
as the company gains sufficient time to chill the campaign through vari-
ous union suppression tactics. It is noteworthy in this regard that empiri-
cal studies find that the probability of a union victory declines as the
length of the campaign period increases.m Given these considerations, I
conclude that shortening the length of the election campaign to a median
length of four weeks is desirable as a means of better protecting em-
ployee free choice.239
234. See id. at 71.
235. See id. at 72-73.
236. See id. at 72.
237. See id., at 68.
238. See Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-
Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 16, at 75-89.
239. Some proponents of labor law reform go further and recommend that elections be
replaced altogether by card checks as a way to expedite the certification process. See Comstock
& Fox, supra note 232, at 73-74. Such a procedure is unacceptable, however, if free and unco-
erced employee choice is the objective, since one party (the union) learns up-front how each
worker has "voted" and can potentially reward supporters and punish opponents.
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A third problematic area concerns time delays in the adjudication of
unfair labor practice charges. Before an employer is legally obligated to
reinstate a discharged employee, for example, the case goes through a
four-stage procedure.24° The employee's charge must first be judged meri-
torious by the Board's regional office, then by an administrative law
judge following a full-scale trial, then by the Board itself, and then by a
federal appeals court. This process takes, on average, three years to com-
plete.24' Although only a minority of cases go through all four stages, the
long delay an employee may face in obtaining reinstatement no doubt
casts a chilling effect on workers' exercise of their right to choose union
representation.
Given all the considerations discussed above, the appropriate stance
labor law should take toward nonunion employee representation com-
mittees should include the following basic components:
*Nonunion employers should be permitted to establish and operate
whatever kinds of employee representation committees are desired.
These committees should be allowed to deal with any and all workplace
issues. To accomplish this end, the definition of a "labor organization" in
section 2(5) of the NLRA should be revised to include only independent
associations of workers organized for purposes of collective bargaining.
242
.Employers should still be prohibited from "dominating" a labor or-
ganization in order to prevent employer subversion of labor unions and
"sweetheart" contracts. The wording of section 8(a)(2) should remain as
it is. Given the revised definition of a labor organization in section 2(5),
the reach of section 8(a)(2) would be limited to independent worker or-
ganizations.
*Legal and administrative changes should be made to speed up
NLRB certification elections. A reasonable target is a median of four
weeks between petition and election. One reasonable method to accom-
plish this goal is to hold certification hearings after the election, rather
than before it, as is now the case.
*Financial penalties of an employer for unfair labor practices, as
enumerated in section 8(a)(3), should be increased in order to create
greater deterrence against illegal anti-union practices. The NLRB should
240. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra
note 12, at 71.
241. See id.
242. As Charles Morris notes, a change in the definition of a "labor organization" in sec-
tion 2(5) will have to be complemented by a similar change in the definition of a labor organiza-
tion in other relevant parts of the labor law, such as section 3(i) of the Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, in order to deregulate nonunion committees fully and consistently.
See Charles Morris, Will There Be a New Direction for American Industrial Relations?-A Hard
Look at the TEAM Bill, the Sawyer Substitute Bill, and the Employee Involvement Bill, 47 LAB.
L.J. 89, 95 (1996).
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also be given expanded section 10(1) authority to seek injunctive relief in
aid of employees harmed by employer acts of anti-union discrimination.243
Also, mandatory arbitration of the first contract should be required after
impasses have extended more than one year.
*It should be declared an unfair labor practice for an employer to es-
tablish a new employee representation committee, or to modify an exist-
ing one, once a union has petitioned for an NLRB election. This provi-
sion will deter the use of such committees solely for purposes of short-run
union avoidance.
These suggested reforms in the NLRA are entirely in the spirit of the
position taken by Sumner Slichter at the time of the New Deal and, if
adopted, would best promote the public interest with respect to the op-
eration of nonunion employee representation plans. Section VII.C pres-
ents additional evidence. Before examining such evidence, however, it is
useful to compare briefly these policy recommendations with two other
sets of recommendations recently proposed for section 8(a)(2).
The first is the recommendations of the Dunlop Commission. The po-
sition laid out by the Commission in its Report and Recommendations,
issued in December 1994, is the following:244
*The broad definition of a "labor organization" in section 2(5) should
be maintained.
eThe language of section 8(a)(2) should also be maintained in broad
outline in order to prevent the re-emergence of management dominated
"company unions., 245
eA qualifying statement should, however, be included in section
8(a)(2) that permits nonunion employee representation committees to
deal with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment as
long as these discussions are "incidental" to issues related to productivity,
216quality, and so on.
*A number of changes in other parts of the NLRA should be enacted
to expedite the union certification process, strengthen the penalties
against employers for unfair labor practices during an organizing cam-
paign, and provide speedier injunctive relief to discharged employees.
243. Section 10(1), as currently written, gives the NLRB authority to provide injunctive re-
lief only in the case of certain union-side violations, such as secondary boycotts. See COM-
MISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 21.
244. See id. at 8-12, 18-24.
245. The Commission's report states that nonunion employee representation committees,
such as that of the Polaroid Corporation, should remain illegal. See id. at 8.
246. Id.
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The second proposed reform in section 8(a)(2) and accompanying
provisions of the NLRA is the TEAM Act legislation pending before
Congress.247 The TEAM Act proposes to:
*maintain the definition of a labor organization as currently contained
in section 2(5);
*modify section 8(a)(2) so that employers and employees can
"address matters of mutual interest," including terms and conditions of
employment;
*maintain the prohibition of employer domination of labor organiza-
tions that seek certification to serve as exclusive bargaining representa-
tives or to enter into collective bargaining contracts; and
*maintain without change the union representation election process,
penalties for employer unfair labor practices, and NLRB administrative
processes.
Relative to the recommendations developed in this paper, it is appar-
ent that both the Dunlop Commission proposals and the TEAM Act
legislation are one-sided and unbalanced with respect to promoting com-
petition and free choice in employee representation. The Dunlop Com-
mission's proposals strengthen the protections given to workers to obtain
independent union representation but then, having established the condi-
tions for fair and effective competition between representational forms,
fail to remove the tight constraints imposed by sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2)
on nonunion employers. The net effect is to promote union representa-
tion while continuing to restrict nonunion representation, even when the
Commission's own recommendations on expedited elections and
strengthened penalties against employers would, if adopted, largely re-
move the ability of employers to use these committees for anything but
win-win outcomes. In this regard, the Commission never explains what
appears to be a major paradox in its recommendations. That is, why
should public policy ban nonunion representation committees if both
parties to the employment relationship-the workers and the employer-
express satisfaction with them, the workers' interests are safeguarded by
a fully protected right to organize, and the committees are part of an on-
going EIP program?2'4
The TEAM Act is also one-sided, but in the opposite direction. While
the Dunlop Commission's recommendations favor organized labor, the
TEAM Act legislation favors employers. The TEAM Act allows employ-
ers much greater latitude to set up any and all forms of nonunion em-
247. S. 295,105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 634,105th Cong. (1997).
248. The Commission's own report states that ongoing EIP programs are a boon for pro-
ductivity, quality, and employee satisfaction. See COMl[MISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 7.
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ployee representation plans and thus promotes greater competition be-
tween union and nonunion forms of representation. Greater competition,
ceteris paribus, is a "plus" for the public interest. But for competition to
serve the public interest it must take place on a level playing field, and
the TEAM Act does not establish one. As argued above, the NLRA at
present contains several shortcomings and weaknesses that allow em-
ployers to exercise undue influence and coercion on employees' choice of
a representational agent. But the TEAM Act contains no provisions to
remedy these defects, such as expedited elections or stronger penalties
for unfair labor practices. It is therefore unbalanced to the extent that it
does not create the conditions necessary for employees to freely opt out
of representational schemes if dissatisfied with their performance. Fur-
thermore, the TEAM Act leaves unchanged the root cause of the prob-
lem with the NLRA-the overly expansive definition of a "labor organi-
zation" in section 2(5).
C. Evidence from Canada
The United States adopted the wrong approach to dealing with non-
union employee representation committees. Rather than ban the com-
mittees, as done in the NLRA (and RLA), the nation would have been
better off to have allowed nonunion employers to operate employee
committees while creating conditions that ensure the committees are not
used for exploitative, illegitimate purposes. These conditions are full
competition and free choice in both the labor market and the "market"
for employee representation. These conditions lead to win-win, mutual-
gain outcomes in nonunion firms. Trade unions would also be motivated
by this competition to devise more innovative, effective programs and to
curb nondemocratic or monopolistic practices in order to attract and
keep members.
For clear evidence of the effectiveness of this proposal, one only need
look north of the American border.
In a recent review of collective bargaining developments in Canada,
Professor Daphne Taras notes that company unions were never outlawed
in Canada as they were in the United States and that many continue to
exist today.2 9 An exemplar is the Joint Industrial Council of the Imperial
Oil Company, Ltd., a company-wide nonunion plan of employee repre-
sentation in continuous operation since 1922 and the closest surviving de-
scendant to the "Rockefeller Plan" established at the Colorado Fuel &
249. See Daphne G. Taras, Collective Bargaining Regulation in Canada and the United
States: Divergent Cultures, Divergent Outcomes, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 204, at 315 [hereinafter Taras, Collective Bargaining];
Taras, supra note 157, at 31.
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Iron Co. in 1915-the employee representation plan that many historians
consider to be the genesis of the company union movement in the United
States.2° As Taras notes, company unions emerged at roughly the same
time in both countries, rose and fell in popularity in lockstep through
1935, and then followed diametrically opposite paths thereafter-banned
in the United States by the NLRA but permitted by Canadian law to the
present day.
The divergent experience of nonunion employee representation in
the two countries in the post-1935 period provides a unique natural ex-
periment of sorts that can shed considerable light on issues that would
otherwise remain topics of speculation. That is, the two countries are
quite similar in terms of social, political, and economic institutions and
approaches to labor policy, but one banned company unions after 1935,
while the other permitted them to exist. Thus, the Canadian experience
post-1935 provides what is probably the best evidence available of what
would have happened in the United States had the NLRA taken a less
restrictive approach to nonunion representation.
Several elements of the Canadian experience merit our attention.
*First, dozens of Canadian firms and public organizations have estab-
lished and continue to operate company-union-like representational
bodies. "1 The clear implication is that, had the NLRA not banned these
structures they would continue to exist today in a number of American
firms.
*Second, only a small minority of nonunion firms in Canada choose to
operate formal, company-wide representational bodies, such as the Joint
Industrial Council at Imperial Oil. 2 This result supports the conclusion
of the managers, attorneys, and consultants interviewed for this study
that formal, large-scale, representational committees and councils along
the lines of the old-style company unions are not likely to re-appear en
masse even if the NLRA's ban on company unions were dropped.
*Third, employers regularly use these employee representational
bodies to deal with employees on matters related to the terms and condi-
tions of employment, including wages, benefits, work scheduling, em-
ployee grievances, and safety. Had Canada adopted the provisions in sec-
tions 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, all of these bodies would have to be
disbanded or substantially modified.25 3
250. See Daniel Nelson, Employee Representation in Historical Perspective, in EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS, supra note 231, at 371,373.
251. See generally Taras, supra note 157.
252. See Anil Verma, Employee Involvement and Representation in Nonunion Firms: What
Canadian Employers Do and Why, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11
(finding few examples of formal company-wide representational bodies).
253. See id.
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*Fourth, although only a minority of Canadian nonunion companies
have set up formal, large-scale plans of employee representation, many
others use smaller, less formal representational bodies as part of their
EIP programs. Moreover, according to a recent study of Canadian EIP
programs by Professor Anil Verma, it is commonplace for managers and
employees to discuss in meetings of these bodies workplace issues that
are related to the terms and conditions of employment. The implication
of this finding is that sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA do indeed
constrain the operation of EIP programs in American nonunion compa-
nies.
*Fifth, the existence of company unions in Canada is, in the words of
Professor Taras, a "nonissue" for Canadians. The ability of nonunion
employers to discuss terms and conditions of employment with workers
in EIP committees simply does not occasion criticism or debate. 52 The
final report of a government task force recently formed to review federal
labor law in Canada, for example, cites no concerns and proposes no
policy changes regarding company unions and employer "domination" of
nonunion EIP committees.25 One can infer that the United States, should
it adopt the Canadian approach to labor law, would also see the debate
on section 8(a)(2) and dominated labor organizations fade into irrele-
vance.
*Sixth, part of the reason nonunion employers in Canada operate
employee representation plans is, according to their own testimony, to
remain union-free.2 But they are prevented by Canadian labor law, with
its strong protections of the right to organize, from using employee com-
mittees as part of an illegal union suppression strategy. The implication
for American labor law is that nonunion representation committees work
well as long as employees have the ability to gain union representation if
they desire it.
*Seventh, there appears to be little evidence that the ability of non-
union employers in Canada to operate company unions and other kinds
of representational committees has adversely affected the organized la-
bor movement in Canada. It is noteworthy, for example, that union den-
sity (the proportion of the workforce organized) in Canada is thirty-four
254. See id.
255. See Taras, Collective Bargaining, supra note 249, at 317.
256. See ANDREw SIMs, SEEKING A BALANCE: CANADA LABOUR CODE PART I, REVIEW
(1995).
257. See Boone, supra note 173 ("Our company prefers to deal with employee-related
challenges and opportunities directly with employees to the greatest possible extent.... Impe-
rial believes, and I believe, that the best relationships can exist without the use of an external
third party, such as a union.").
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percent; that figure is only fifteen percent in the United States.25 Part of
the reason why union density is so much higher in Canada is that the em-
ployer-created representation plans are often successfully co-opted by
independent trade unions. For example, one-third of the new members
organized by the Canadian-based Communications, Energy, and Paper
Union came from raids on nonunion representation committees. 259 The
implication from the Canadian experience is, therefore, that American
trade unions should not oppose relaxation of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2), if
this step is taken in conjunction with other revisions to the NLRA that
strengthen the right to organize.
These findings suggest that Canada has found a way to enjoy the best
of outcomes-nonunion employers are permitted to operate whatever
kind of employee committees they want, with gains in productivity, qual-
ity, and employee relations, a larger proportion of Canadian than Ameri-
can employees have some formal mechanism for "voice" in the work-
place, the Canadian labor movement is stronger and more vibrant than
its American counterpart, and the existence of company unions and other
forms of nonunion employee representation in Canada occasions very lit-
tle public debate or criticism.
Canada has accomplished this by structuring its labor law to promote
maximum competition and free choice in the "market" for employee rep-
resentation. In particular, Canadian labor law differs from American law
in these regards:
*Canadian labor law at both the federal and provincial level prohibits
employer "domination" of a labor organization' 6 1 For example, the Sas-
katchewan Trade Union Act states in section 11(1):
It shall be an unfair labour practice for an employer, employer's agent or any
other person acting on behalf of the employer to... (b) discriminate or inter-
fere with the formation or administration of any labour organization or con-
tribute financial or other support to it2... (k) to bargain collectively with a
company dominated organization ....
*A key difference between the American and Canadian approaches
concerns the definition of a labor organization. Both federal and provin-
cial laws define a labor organization narrowly to include only independ-
258. See Taras, Collective Bargaining, supra note 249, at 303.
259. See Reg Baskin, My Experience with Unionization of Nonunion Employee Representa-
tion Plans in Canada, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11.
260. See Taras, Collective Bargaining, supra note 249, at 317.
261. See Daphne Taras, Evolution of Nonunion Employee Representation in Canada, in
NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 11 (providing a comprehensive review of
federal and provincial statutes corresponding to sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the American
NLRA). Note that the federal labor code in Canada covers only about 10% of the workforce,
while provincial law covers the remainder. See id.
262. Id.
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ent worker associations constituted for purposes of collective bargaining.
Thus, the Saskatchewan statute states in section 2(j): "'Labour organiza-
tion' means an organization of employees, not necessarily employees of
one employer, that has bargaining collectively among its purposes."' 263
*Because nonunion employee committees are not independent
worker associations for purposes of collective bargaining, they do not
qualify as "labor organizations" and hence fall outside the purview of the
Canadian federal and provincial regulations of collective bargaining.
Thus, a Canadian nonunion employer can establish and operate such a
committee without committing an unfair labor practice, as long as the
committee is not established as an agency for collective bargaining and
does not interfere in any respect with a union's campaign to organize the
workers. 4
*Canada also differs from the United States in that it provides
stronger protections of the right to organize.2 5 The federal sector and
several Canadian provinces, for example, allow union certification based
on petitioning or a majority signing of union membership cards, while
others (Ontario, for example) require that secret ballot elections be held
within five days of petition.2 6 Also, Canadian federal and provincial labor
boards typically take a far more restrictive view of what constitutes per-
missible employer action during an organizing campaign, and several
provinces give their labour boards relatively broad discretion in ordering
certification of a union upon evidence of employer misconduct.
Collectively, these provisions for expedited union certification and
stricter regulation of employer conduct during an organizing campaign
may unduly tip the playing field toward the union side, while specific
provisions (card check certification, for example) are fundamentally
nondemocratic. These shortcomings do not, however, obviate the main
lesson the Canadian example has for the American debate on section
8(a)(2). Canadian labor law illustrates the correct approach to nonunion
employee representation, which is to permit employers to adopt nonun-
ion employee committees but also to ensure, through strict legal protec-
tions of the right to organize, that employers cannot use the representa-
tion committees for purposes that are illegitimate or that run contrary to
the social good. 67 The fact that company unions and other forms of non-
263. Id.
264. See id.
265. See Taras, Collective Bargaining, supra note 249, at 321-26.
266. See id.
267. A number of American proponents of labor law reform have approvingly cited the
Canadian example with regard to expedited elections and stronger penalties for unfair labor
practices but have conspicuously ignored the other side of the Canadian model-the legaliza-
tion of company unions. See, e.g., WELLER, supra note 215, at 254-61; Paul C. Weiler, Promises
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union employee representation are widespread across Canada but occa-
sion no public policy debate and little criticism suggests that the United
States could also have the same outcome if the NLRA (and RLA) were
reformed to follow more closely the Canadian model.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article began with consideration of the Electromation ruling by
the National Labor Relations Board. In that case, the Board ruled that
the company committed an unfair labor practice by forming five em-
ployee action committees for purposes of working with management to
devise changes in certain employment policies that were a source of em-
ployee dissatisfaction.m From a purely legal perspective, the Board
reached the correct decision, given the language of sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2) of the NLRA. Viewed from a public policy perspective, however,
the Electromation decision is counterproductive because it impedes both
the competitiveness of American industry and the opportunity for
worker voice and participation in the workplace. The NLRA, therefore,
should be revised.
Canadian labor law provides the best model for the proper direction
for reform of the NLRA. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA should, therefore,
remain unchanged, but the definition of a labor organization under sec-
tion 2(5) should be narrowed to include only independent associations of
workers formed for the purpose of collective bargaining. This narrowed
definition would permit nonunion companies to establish and operate
whatever type of employee representation committee they desire while
protecting bona fide labor unions from employer domination.29 To pre-
vent employers from using the employee committees to impose exploita-
To Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1769, 1808-22 (1983).
268. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
269. Clyde Summers and Charles Morris, among others, advocate allowing nonunion em-
ployers to operate representational committees that discuss terms and conditions of employ-
ment but only under certain restrictive conditions-principally that employees be allowed to
select representatives of their own choosing in a secret-ballot election and have the opportunity
to accept or reject by majority vote the establishment of the employer's committee. See Morris,
supra note 242, at 100; Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structural
Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CIL-KENT L. REV. 129, 139-40 (1993). I oppose such a stipula-
tion because it: hinders employers from operating the types of EIP committees and teams that
they view as most conducive to increased efficiency and productivity; introduces needless bu-
reaucracy, inflexibility, and politics into the workplace; and does not substantively increase the
protection of employee rights beyond what is accomplished by the proposals outlined in this
Article. Voting is not a prerequisite for effective free choice regarding employer-created repre-
sentation committees and carries with it a number of costs. The one restriction on the operation
of employer committees that I believe has considerable merit is that, when the committees deal
with the resolution of employment disputes, they be required to conform to minimum standards
of procedural equity, such as recommended by the COMMISSION ON THE FtTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 31-33.
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tive or unjust terms and conditions of employment, the NLRA should
also follow in broad outline the Canadian approach by strengthening
workers' rights both to organize and engage in collective bargaining.
In effect, I advocate a melding of the reform proposals advanced by
the Dunlop Commission and the TEAM Act. These revisions to the
NLRA, combined with competitive, full employment conditions in labor
markets, would ensure that nonunion employee representation commit-
tees lead to win-win outcomes for employers as well as employees.
Critics of reform of the NLRA argue that the Electromation decision
is a nonissue because, first, it allows employers full freedom to form em-
ployee representation committees for purposes of improving productivity
and quality, second, liberalization of the NLRA would allow employers
to operate "sham" company unions, and, third, the probability of being
charged with a section 8(a)(2) violation is so small, as are the penalties if
found guilty, that the NLRA is not, from a practical point of view, a seri-
ous constraint on employers' ability to run effective employee and in-
volvement programs. The evidence and arguments advanced in this Arti-
cle dispute all three contentions.
The six case studies of advanced EIP programs demonstrate that the
majority of subject companies make use of employee representation
committees and that these committees often deal with management over
terms and conditions of employment. If scrutinized by the NLRB, many
of these EIP programs would have to be revised, in some cases signifi-
cantly. The evidence from Canada, as well as from interviews with
American managers, labor attorneys, and consultants, suggests that liber-
alization of the NLRA would indeed result in the reappearance of some
company-union-like representational bodies, although perhaps not in
great numbers. These representational committees and councils, how-
ever, are not objectionable on their face, because they are nondemocratic
in nature or necessarily toothless shams. Although nonunion employee
committees are "dominated" (and thus nondemocratic organizations),
every other aspect of a nonunion company's human resource manage-
ment program is unilaterally designed and operated, and no one seriously
protests that arrangement. Further, although some employee committees
in nonunion companies may be completely ineffectual or operated for no
other reason than greater short-term profit, they cannot be tools of ex-
ploitation or inequitable treatment as long as workers have relatively
easy and costless access to union representation. Finally, evidence from
the field interviews suggests that while the constraining effect of the
NLRA on EIP programs is, indeed, offset to some degree by the weak
penalties and sporadic enforcement of section 8(a)(2), the majority of
companies nonetheless try to adhere fairly closely to current law.
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I believe the case for reform of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
is compelling. Two decades of experimentation and experience with EIP
programs indicates that they are a valuable method of increasing the
competitiveness and efficiency of American industry as well as the em-
powerment and job satisfaction of American employees. Further, the
traditional organizational vehicle for employee voice at the workplace-
the labor union-now represents only one in ten private sector workers,
but nearly two-thirds of employees report that they want more opportu-
nities for involvement and participation at work and that the preferred
vehicle for more involvement is some form of cooperative joint em-
ployer-employee committee outside of the traditional collective bargain-
ing mold7 0 There is thus a large "representation gap" in the American
workplace, and the majority of American workers say they prefer to see
it filled by some form of nontraditional employee representation commit-
tee-exactly the kind of representational body that the NLRA under-
mines according to the Electromation decision.
Critics object to liberalizing the NLRA because nonunion EIP com-
mittees, in their view, exist only to serve management's interests and
provide employees with only a facade of empowerment and few if any
tangible benefits. Rather than ban these committees outright, however,
the better position, and the one more consonant with the American ethos
of free choice, is to secure the right of employees to organize and then let
the workers decide which representational form (if any) they desire. Just
as was the case in the 1920s and 1930s, many workers will choose a non-
union form of representation.
In ending, I would like to quote the following statement by one of the
employee representatives on the Personnel Board Council of Company
C. No management personnel were in the room when the statement was
made.
The key to a lot of what you've heard today is that the seven of us do not get
paid any extra for all these extra hours we put into this job [serving on the
Council], all the traveling we do, and all the time away from family. We are
here because we want to improve the company, very unlike a union represen-
tative who is paid to represent people. We're here to bridge a gap that I think
the company had enough foresight to see. So we volunteered and we are do-
ing this job without extra pay. When you look at the long term of why the
seven people are here it is because we truly want to be the voice of the em-
ployees to the company.
I believe that most Americans would agree that this kind of attitude is
one to be encouraged, as it is highly productive for the company and all
of its stakeholders, including employees. Over time, of course, this em-
270. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 86.
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ployee and her fellow representatives and co-workers may discover that
the council does not provide the effective voice they desire or proves dis-
appointing in solving their workplace problems. This happened in dozens
of cases in the 1930s, and it would no doubt happen again, if nonunion
employee committees were deregulated. Rather than further retard un-
ion growth, legalization of the committees--coupled with stronger pro-
tections of the right to organize-would most likely bring into the ranks
of organized labor many thousands of new members.

